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Abstract
This thesis examines the role of street art in the uprisings in the Middle East and North
Africa in 2011 in order to investigate the extent to which the political struggle was also a
visual struggle. Through analysis of murals and graffiti, it seeks to address how
revolutionary politics are created, consumed, and witnessed in images. In Egypt,
protesters created street art that coopted public space in order to circumvent the state’s
authority and subvert the state’s legitimacy. Due to its accessible nature, street art also
democratized the protest process, facilitating a truly popular revolutionary movement. In
Syria, citizens used satire to confront the state’s brutality and challenge the unequal
power dynamics between the regime and the people. In Lebanon, artists created work that
transcended sectarian, national, and regional borders in an effort to cultivate
reconciliation, community responsibility, and global solidarity. This thesis argues that the
creation, alteration, and dissemination of images gave voice to citizen collectivities in
their struggle against the state. It argues that art is a meaningful form of participatory
politics and community engagement.
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Preface

I never imagined I would be writing this thesis, and, at times, I never imagined I
would finish this thesis. This thesis is, in large part, borne out of my experience in a
history course at Claremont McKenna College taught by Professor Heather Ferguson
called “Nations, Nationalism, and the Global Middle East.” Through the instruction,
materials, and conversations of this course, I was encouraged to reexamine my
understandings of many of the structures and institutions that shape our lives—namely,
the nation-state and citizenship. From Hannah Arendt to Benedict Anderson, we studied
the historical and theoretical underpinnings of these concepts, investigating how citizens
encounter and interact with the state apparatus and charting the constantly shifting power
dynamics from one historical moment to the next. My understanding of revolutionary
practices, social movements, collective action, creativity, surveillance, and public space
began to shift.
This was the context in which I first read “Beeshu’s Laugh: The Arts of Satire in
the Syrian Uprising” by Stephennie Mulder. This article, which I will revisit in Chapter
II, examines the cynical and self-mocking art created during the Syrian uprising in 2011.
Mulder argues that, despite their dark nature, these art forms actually served to create
agency and empower the Syrian people. I had never before quite realized the magnitude
of cultural production and its influence on communities and their collective identity.
Thus, Mulder destabilized my assumptions about power, agency, and resistance as
traditionally and predominately political acts. “Beeshu’s Laugh” sparked an array of
questions, some of which I spent nearly a year attempting to answer.
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This is a thesis about the people, as a collective, and their public art. A series of
questions drives this inquiry: how is revolutionary politics created, consumed, and
witnessed in images? To what extent is the political struggle a visual struggle? If both
politics and art are the performances of representational power, how are they enacted
through spatialized processes?
In response to these queries, this thesis presents a series of three case studies—
revolutionary Egypt, warring Syria, and divided Lebanon. In each chapter, I investigate
the ways in which street art is used to articulate the people’s experiences and express
their desires. The images form the heart of this thesis. While they are embedded in
political contexts and presented against the backdrop of historical legacies, I have
attempted to center the role of the people and their art. While I cannot possibly capture
the breadth of artwork produced, I intentionally chose images that I believe are
illustrative of the themes that emerge in each nation.
This thesis is meant to serve as an intervention in traditional modes of
understanding the Arab region and the Arab Uprisings. Faced with an outpouring of
scholarship that focuses on the transition of political power from one elite cohort to
another—oftentimes facilitated by foreign governments and their neo-imperialist
ventures—it is all the more urgent that we study the arts of the uprisings. Art functions as
an alternative lens through which to understand the experiences of citizens, the struggle
between the citizenry and the state, and the power of collective action. This is a thesis
celebrating the liberating power of ground-up social movements, collective action, and
truly revolutionary historical moments—all of which found their voice in the arts.
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Introduction
Public Art and the Political Struggle

“A good mural is one that talks to the citizens surrounding it;
it becomes part of the city and it becomes theirs, not the artist’s.”
–Yazan Halwani, Lebanese street artist

In late 2010 and throughout 2011, millions of ordinary people throughout the
Middle East mobilized and organized in mass protest, a phenomenon which the
international media quickly dubbed the “Arab Spring.” While protesters took to the
streets to demand that specific authoritarian leaders relinquish power and transfer it to the
people, the revolutions were also a product of the longer historical trajectory of the
region. In popular discourse, the story of the political and social uprisings across the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) began with the self-immolation of Tunisian street
vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in 2010.1 However, the turmoil of late 2010 and early 2011
was actually the culmination of decades of social inequality created by global
interference and “liberalizing” market economies, compounded by brutal policing
perpetuated by authoritarian regimes in the region. The uprisings were part of a global
historical context, inextricably tied to the legacy of colonialism, the imposition of

1

MENA is a popular shorthand for the region of the Middle East and North Africa. The term Middle East
is geographically ambiguous and Eurocentric. While alternatives such as West Asia and North Africa,
abbreviated as WANA, have been proposed, such terms have not yet become part of the vernacular. For the
purposes of this thesis, I will intermittently use the term MENA to refer to the region in question because
the term remains the most prominently used by most organizations, academia, and political entities.
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artificial boundaries, post-colonial efforts to restructure the nation, the consequential
consolidation of power within authoritarian regimes, and the continued intervention of
foreign governments.

Historical Background
Before contemporary nation-states existed, the Ottoman Empire dominated the
region. The Ottomans began as one of many nomadic principalities in central Anatolia,
but by the Battle of Bapheus in 1301, proved themselves as a powerful military force and
a rapidly growing empire maintained through a centralized administration. At its height
in the sixteenth century, the Empire spanned three continents—reaching from the
outskirts of Vienna to Algeria, by way of the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula.
Because the Empire encompassed such a large geographic region, it was “a vast mosaic
of peoples, a living museum of physical types, belief systems, languages, and cultures.”2
The Ottoman administration practiced a policy of tolerance of most religious and ethnic
identities in order to focus their attention on military, economic, and territorial gains.
After the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent from 1520 to 1566, the Empire
began to shift and constrict—especially marked by a failed attempt to capture the city of
Vienna in 1683. The stagnation of expansion occurred in tandem with political unrest and
economic concerns, as the Empire witnessed an upsurge in political participation and
dispersion of power. Meanwhile, between 1830 and 1870 in particular, European
imperialists amassed colonial influence in the region, namely: the French in North Africa,

Lawrence Davidson and Arthur Goldschmidt, “Introduction,” A Concise History of the Middle East, 9th
ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), 11.
2
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Lebanon, and Syria and the British in Egypt, Iraq, Palestine and Iran. The Ottoman
Empire was formally dissolved at the end of World War I, when the Central Powers fell
in 1918. Britain and France seized this opportunity to implement a mandate system which
invented regions separated by artificial state boundaries, thus creating a situation in
which physical boundaries were not always aligned with collective consciousness.
Similarly, Egypt technically gained independence from British colonial rule in 1922, but
Britain retained power over matters of defense and foreign policy, effectively creating a
puppet government in Egypt. Thus, European colonial administrations dismantled the
Ottoman Empire and imported the concept of the nation-state to draw new borders,
creating the map of the Middle East that exists today.
The fracturing of the diverse empire into nation-states along artificial borders and
the enduring colonial presence irreparably shaped the consequent history of the Middle
East. The new nation-states were drawn “to serve European imperial interests” in the
region.3 In fact, the manufactured borders “imposed conditions that were ill-suited to the
needs of the region’s inhabitants.”4 In many areas, the European-imposed borders
separated ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups, while also consolidating distinct groups
under the guise of a common national identity. Ever since, Arab leaders “have had to
cope with the consequence of those borders.”5 The uprisings across various Middle
Eastern nations in 2011 was a phenomenon entrenched in the legacy of colonialism,

William L. Cleveland and Martin P. Bunton, “The 2011 Arab Uprisings and Their Aftermath,” A History
of the Modern Middle East, 4th ed. (New York: Routledge, 2016), 554.
4
Cleveland and Bunton, 554.
5
Ibid.
3
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violence, and state-making projects; it was a product of a much larger historical context
than only the twenty-first century.
The process of decolonization in the latter half of the twenty-first century also
contributed to creating the particular political and social context from which the 2011
uprisings eventually arose. Following the Second World War, resistance to colonial
control and burgeoning nationalist movements coalesced, resulting in the formation of
new government systems and independent nations. As with colonization, the transition to
post-colonial nation-states was a volatile and violent moment in the history of many
Middle Eastern and North African nations; for example, Algeria won independence from
the France through an eight-year war in which somewhere between 90,000 and 300,000
people perished.
In the post-colonial period, newly independent countries harnessed a nationalist
agenda to establish new political structures to organize society and meet the needs of the
population. This “first wave of reformers,” as William L. Cleveland describes them,
attempted to restructure society to more fairly distribute national resources and economic
opportunity.6 In the 1950s and 60s, many nations established social programs, such as
welfare programs to aid the most vulnerable citizens, land reforms to redistribute
ownership, and increased expenditures on educational opportunities. Similarly, many
transformed their economies into planned economies, wherein the government acts as the
central planner that controls or owns the means of production. For example, as President
of Egypt, Gamal Nasser instituted social programs, such as free health care, which
targeted the most vulnerable strata. Additionally, he grew the national economy through

6

Ibid., 555.
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modernization projects such as the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. However,
over the next several decades, it became increasingly clear that many of these initiatives
had fallen short of their goal to meet the socioeconomic demands of the people.
In the 1970s and 80s, succeeding generations of Arab leaders adopted free-market
strategies, which appeared to improve economies superficially, but in reality, “resulted in
crony capitalism.”7 As a result, elites strengthened their grip on political and economic
power, while middle and lower class citizens struggled. Reduced expenditures on social
programs like education, health care, and housing, coupled with soaring costs of food and
everyday items, generated economic turmoil; the undemocratic transfer of power
(sometimes even passed down through the family) and the consolidation of power within
a single political party revealed the extent to which the public was excluded from
political participation; and, the increasing presence of security and policing mechanisms
solidified the presence of authoritarian regimes. The failure of post-colonial governments
to actualize their national projects led to widespread disillusionment on the part of the
people. As historian William L. Cleveland succinctly states, from the 1950s onward, it
became increasingly clear that “the political promise of independence had vanished.”8
The uprisings of 2011 were a culmination of historical moments and legacies
ranging from the early nineteenth century to the twenty-first: imperial pursuits in the
Ottoman Empire, followed by the dismemberment of the Empire and division into nationstates according to European interests, in which emerging leaders and their successors
were unable to adequately uphold the promises of the national project, and the devolution

7
8

Ibid., 539.
Ibid., 555.
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of those government systems into single-party authoritarian regimes. Thus, the precise
historical moment in which the uprisings occurred was a product of decades of global
political ineptitude and economic turmoil compounded by the failure to grapple with the
insidious aftershocks of colonialism. The revolutions, while rooted in historical legacies,
articulated distinct demands for economic improvements, civil and political freedoms,
and social justice.

Street Art in Protest
As suppression of political activism escalated—especially activism through labor
unions, political parties, and religious movements—art became a medium for protest.
During the Arab uprisings, one of the multitude of ways protesters articulated their
demands for political and social reform was through the use of public art. Activists
harnessed their creativity to use the surfaces of the city as a canvas for graffiti and
murals. The art produced ranged in topic from critiques of specific leaders and regimes,
to calls for collective action, to satirical quips recognizing the complicity of the public, to
desperate pleas for peace and nonviolence. Many of these artworks surfaced on the
internet and were picked up by an international audience, both throughout the region and
beyond.
This thesis will explore the role of public art in protest in the Middle East and
North Africa, particularly during the period of popular revolution in the early twenty-first
century. The project will address such questions as: What visual forms did protest take
during the Arab uprisings? What were the purposes and implications of using art as a
form of protest? Why was art a significant weapon for political and social reform? These

6

questions capture the ways in which many activists drew upon collective experiences of
political disenfranchisement, socioeconomic inequality, and violent policing to create art
that co-opted public space and facilitated transnational solidarity. In doing so, they
asserted a cultural identity that existed outside of the state and inspired an imagining of
social change, resulting in the democratization of the revolutions and a decrease in the
legitimacy of the state and its authority over the public. From this phenomenon, four
main themes emerge: the capacity of street art to subvert state authority, democratize the
protest process, challenge state-sponsored violence, and facilitate transnationalism. This
thesis analyzes examples of street art in Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon in the early twentyfirst century, situating art and artistic movements within each nation’s unique political
context, in order to elucidate these four main themes.

Theoretical Grounding
Before examining specific pieces of street art, we must establish a foundation of
theoretical frameworks that illuminate the interlocking nature of history, art, politics, and
power—all of which require us to consider the political and social implications of public
space and the movement of bodies within that space. This section will address three areas
of theory: first, the relationship between art and politics; second, the political dimensions
of public space; and third, the dynamics of gender in regards to issues of the individual
and the state. These theoretical frameworks will allow us to conceptualize how these
elements intersect and play out in the streets of Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon.

7

Art and Politics
The relationship between art and politics is dynamic, multifaceted, and often
dependent on the political and cultural environment under consideration. Several
common themes emerge, however, from an examination of scholarly work on the subject.
First, the relationship between art and politics is reciprocal—each depends on and
influences the other. As Sarah H. Awad and Brady Wagoner explain in Street Art of
Resistance, “politics builds on art just as much as art is guided by political values and
discourses”.9 Awad and Wagoner clarify that all art is political, even if it is not the
artist’s intention to make a political statement, because all artistic expression relies on
those politically influenced “values and discourses”.10 This brings us to our second point:
art and politics are inextricably linked. In Image Politics in the Middle East, Lina Khatib
argues that the political struggle “is an inherently visually productive process”11 This
means that images are central to political struggles and, conversely, politics are central to
the production and interpretation of images. The claim that all art is political is easier to
see and accept than the latter claim (that all politics is art). This thesis seeks to argue that
politics is in itself a form of art because it is a struggle over representation, depiction, and
visibility.
Due to its reciprocal and inherent qualities, political art successfully produces a
cognitive reaction in viewers, cultivating an imaginative mindset and laying the
groundwork for collective action. Awad and Wagoner argue that, unlike other forms of

Sarah H. Awad and Brady Wagoner, “Introducing the Street Art of Resistance,” Street Art of Resistance,
eds. Sarah H. Awad & Brady Wagoner (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 20.
10
Ibid.
11
Lina Khatib, “Introduction: The Visual in Political Struggle,” Image Politics in the Middle East (London:
I.B. Tauris & Co, 2013), 1.
9
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political discourse, art’s aesthetic qualities produce “a kind of ‘aura’ that lures us to it,
that arrests us, affects us, and provokes us to thought”.12 Street art is particularly effective
because of its location in highly trafficked and significant urban locations, its often
massive size, and the pointed commentary that it provides on an aspect of the citizens’
lived experiences within the social, cultural, and political environment. Thus, viewing
street art is an engaging and immersive experience for on-lookers, that elicits a kind of
“total organic resonance”.13 Awad and Wagoner argue that this resonance operates on
several levels: “emotionally, it can be experienced as cathartic and inspire a variety of
emotional states from outrage to hope”; “socially, it encourages participation and
solidarity”; and, “cognitively, it opens up new perspectives for action”.14 Thus, street art
operates on a micro level to produce change within individual minds and on a macro
level to inspire collective action—an essential precondition for protest. Art is not only a
product, but also is a form of activism—specifically, creative activism. As we shall see
further on in this thesis, art is not auxiliary to protest movements, but rather, a central
component of political and social change.
Lastly, the relationship between art and politics contains a spatialized element,
which is tied to power. As Khatib established, art and politics are both performances of
representational power. For street art, however, we must consider the added component
of spatiality. In Political Aesthetics, Crispin Sartwell presents his theory of “political
aesthetics,” in which he argues that political systems are not only textual doctrines, but

12

Awad and Wagoner, 71.
Ibid.
14
Ibid., 30.
13
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rather, are also “aesthetic environments”.15 Because all politics are aesthetic, he purports
that scholars must include an analysis of “aesthetic features,” such as design and
configuration, in political theory.16 The kind of primary sources used in this thesis—street
art borne out of specific political systems—is a prime example of a study where
Sartwell’s theory is applicable. Sartwell defines politics as the “place where the power is
transacted or shaped”.17 Given this, and given that all politics are aesthetic, as Sartwell
claims, then political aesthetics must be present at “sites were power is negotiated and
distributed, and public or social identities are constituted or articulated”.18 In other words,
sites of politics are sites of art—both of which are sites of power. Because political power
is represented in design, shape, and form in public places, the street artist asserts power.
As the artist lays claim to alter the design, shape, and form of spaces, his or her actions
are also imbued with political significance. Thus, Sartwell’s theoretical perspective
further illustrates the notion that street art is a courageous form of political activism.

Public Space
The ways in which the reciprocal and inherent relationship between art and
politics plays out in a spatialized landscape brings us to our second theoretical
framework: the development and structure of public space. In order to examine the
political nature of street art in twenty-first century Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, we must
first consider the physical context of the artwork. A major element of street art’s impact

Crispin Sartwell, “Introduction: The Idea of Political Aesthetics,” Political Aesthetics (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2010), 10.
16
Sartwell, 7-8.
17
Ibid., 9.
18
Ibid., 10.
15
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is the fact that it co-opts public space. Thus, we must consider the role of public space in
shaping the social and political landscapes of the urban community in which the art
exists.
Since the 1960’s, philosophers have produced a great body of academic work that
explores theories of public space. In 1962, Jürgen Habermas published The Structural
Transformation of the Public Sphere, in which he investigated the origins of what he
deemed the bourgeois public sphere. Prior to the emergence of this phenomenon in the
eighteenth century, the public sphere was simply the sphere of public authority, which
took the form of “continuous state activity” through the “continuity of contact” with
those engaged in the exchange of commodities and labor.19 In other words, “’public’ in
this narrower sense was synonymous with ‘state-related’”.20 Because the public realm
was dominated and controlled by the state, citizens were “the private people” who were
“merely subject to” and “negatively defined by” this state authority.21 Thus, citizens
were, by nature of the way in which the state was constructed and functioned, “excluded
from any share in public authority”.22 In this sense, Habermas is no revolutionary; many
theorists before and after his time agree that the nation-state is a concept predicated on
the exclusion of certain groups, such as Hannah Arendt, who we will encounter later in
this thesis. However, Habermas’s incorporation of public space into this discussion is
unique.

19

Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of
Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1989), 18.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
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It was from this exclusionary environment that the bourgeois public sphere
emerged in the eighteenth century. Habermas argues that the bourgeois public sphere
“may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public”.23
In this new public sphere, the people compelled public authority (i.e. the state) “to
legitimate itself before public opinion”.24 As private individuals were incorporated into
the public sphere, the state bore an element of accountability to the people. Citizens
demanded a voice in shaping public authority, thus transforming the public sphere into a
forum where the governing of public exchanges and public-private relations could be
debated.25 In this seminal work, Habermas traces how the public sphere evolved from a
narrow state-centered concept to a broader definition that was dually comprised of topdown state authority and bottom-up collective participation.
Habermas sets up the confrontational relationship between the state and the
citizens, describing how each group wrestles for control over public space, public
authority, and thus, power. This relationship is important moving forward, as we
encounter citizens who, through artistic means, acted as agents of change by co-opting
state-dominated public space, thus inherently challenging the state’s right to control that
public space, and consequentially, decreasing the legitimacy of the state apparatus itself.
While Habermas’ work is primarily a theoretical and conceptual endeavor viewed
through a prism of economic thought, he nonetheless illuminates how the landscape of
space played a role in the development of modern life.

23

Ibid., 27.
Ibid., 25.
25
Ibid., 27.
24
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As Habermas interrogated public-ness, he raised new questions about how public
relations played out in spatial ways, and thus, how space shaped public relations.
Habermas’s work catalyzed other philosophers to study the role of public space,
particularly urban geography. For many decades, geography was thought of as something
that existed in the background and had some influence on our lives, but remained outside
of the ways in which society was constructed. Habermas paved the way for others who
sought to bring the consideration of public space into philosophical and academic
pursuits. The subsequent landmark philosopher of public space, Henri Lefebvre,
accomplished this through his examination of what he called “social space.”
In 1974, Lefebvre investigated the ways in which space is produced and used in
society, both historically and at the time of his writing. In the introduction to The
Production of Space, he outlines his goal to “expose the actual production of space by
bringing the various kinds of space and the modalities of their genesis together within a
single theory”.26 Lefebvre’s lofty goal rests on the central argument that “(social) space is
a (social) product”.27 In other words, every public space is crafted, whether intentionally
or simply as a by-product of societal processes, by society. Lefebvre identifies three
implications of this argument. First, that “(physical) natural space is disappearing”.28 As
societies grow, spaces transform through urbanization. Second, that “every
society…produces a space, its own space”.29 Each society, including the multiple unique
sub-societies that exist within the larger society (i.e. a nation, a city, a neighborhood), has

26

Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 1991), 16.
Ibid., 30.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid., 31.
27
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a unique relationship to space and shapes that space in specific and meaningful ways.
And third, that “if space is a product, our knowledge of it must be expected to reproduce
and expound the process of production”.30 By this statement, Lefebvre argues that we
must give more critical attention to the production of space, not just space itself, in
considering how power relations are produced and re-produced.
Inherent in Lefebvre’s third implication is also the assertion that the process of
production and the product itself are two inseparable aspects of space. A space contains
within it both the past and the present. The history of a space, meaning “sense of what
happened at a particular spot or place and thereby changed it—all of this becomes
inscribed in space”.31 Nonetheless, the space exists in the present as “an immediate
whole, complete with association and connections in their actuality”.32 With this assertion
that a space contains both the past and the present, the product and the process, Lefebvre
moves us closer to the issue at hand in this thesis: public art. Just as Lefebvre writes
about space, a piece of street art is “an immediate whole” that addresses an issue in this
particular moment in history; yet, the same art piece also interacts with the past via its
location in a particular public space, and thus, all that happened in that space.
Furthermore, public art is important both as an artistic product and as a creative process.
The product itself has value—whether by critiquing a regime, generating a discourse, or
inspiring collective imagination; and, the process of the art’s creation has value because
the artist made a deliberate choice to co-opt public space and thus confront state
authority. It is crucial to give due consideration to not only the art itself, but also the act

30

Ibid., 36.
Ibid., 37.
32
Ibid.
31
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of creating the art because space as a process contains within it the mechanisms by which
power relations are produced and re-produced. It is these power relations that artists
struggle to re-define.
Lefebvre, perhaps the single most influential theorist of public space, changed the
landscape of academia with the publication of The Production of Space. But as we edged
towards the turn of the century, academics had more to say about the role of urbanization
and public space. In 1985, David Harvey traced the history of the commodification of
space in Consciousness & The Urban Experience, arguing that the rise of the
transportation and communication industries during the nineteenth century was the
precise historical moment in which space and power became related.33 More specifically,
in modern urban societies, social power is derived from “command over money,
command over space, and command over time”.34 Through the domination of these three
separate but overlapping sources of power, a state can continually reproduce its own
authority, edging closer and closer to the modern surveillance state. Harvey’s argument
that command over space is a form of power thus begs the question: “In whose image and
to whose benefit is space to be shaped?”35 He argues that from the nineteenth century
onward, “the capacity to appropriate space freely” has become an “important and vital
freedom,” and thus, restrictions on this freedom sparks uprisings and revolutions.36
Attempts to liberate public space from state control and domination characterize urban
protest movements and community struggles. This situation has produced what Harvey

33

David Harvey, Consciousness and the Urban Experience (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 1985), 13.
Ibid., 1.
35
Ibid., 13.
36
Ibid., 18.
34
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sees as “a permanent tension” between, on the one hand, the “appropriation” of urban
space by and for members of the public, and on the other hand, the “domination” of
urban space by the state in order to solidify social hierarchies.37 Harvey further articulates
Habermas’ positioning of the state against the citizens, applying his theoretical ideas to a
distinctly urban and modern environment. Harvey’s exploration of this permanent tension
will factor heavily into our discussion of public art created by citizens in the throes of
revolution and the state’s attempt to regulate such creative forms of protest.
Building Harvey’s assertion that space and power are related, Edward Soja
focuses on the social hierarchies that are manifested in and reproduced by the
organization and domination of space. Soja recognizes that the spatial organization of
modern urban life has significantly contributed to, if not caused, inequalities among
races, classes, and genders, and thus, suggests an examination of spatiality as a potential
route to solutions. In his 2010 book, Seeking Spatial Justice, Soja argues that justice, too,
has “a consequential geography, a spatial expression.”38 Thus, the organization of public
space has the potential to shape society in a just or an unjust way, what Soja calls “the
spatiality of (in)justice”.39 By incorporating a spatial perspective into our study of the
world, we can “make better theoretical and practical sense of how social justice is
created, maintained, and brought into question.”40 Particularly, spatial justice takes the
form of “collective struggles to achieve more equitable access of all residents to the
social resources and advantages that the city provides.”41 Soja’s study thus focuses on the

37

Ibid., 13.
Edward Soja, Seeking Spatial Justice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 4.
39
Ibid., 5.
40
Ibid., 2.
41
Ibid., 32.
38
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ways in which the distribution of a city’s benefits and burdens constitutes a form of
justice, which is, in turn, shaped by the organization of public space.
Lastly, Bület Batuman’s study of the TEKEL protest encampment in Ankara,
Turkey offers an illuminating example of the political struggle over public space,
visibility, and power in the Middle East. In 2010, TEKEL employees formed a make-shift
encampment in Ankara’s Kızılay District to protest their mistreatment by the company
upon its dissolution. Batuman argues that, despite its failure to achieve its political goals,
the protest encampment “was significant in terms of the spatial formation of public
space”.42 Due to Turkey’s authoritarian government, “state power limits the effective use
of public space”.43 Thus, by occupying public space in the city centre for over two
months, the protest encampment challenges the Turkish government’s domination and
regulation of that public space, and therefore, challenges the state’s authority. The
protester’s use of an encampment as a political strategy reveals the nature of public space
as a political battleground—serving as a manifestation of Henri Lefebvre’s assertion that
space and power are related. Furthermore, Batuman echoes Habermas and Harvey by
arguing that public space is “a social construct that requires social relations to produce
it”.44 In other words, the production of public space requires a continued engagement in
the struggle for visibility and representation, spatially. Both the protesters and the
government (represented by the police force) participate in this production by repeatedly
engaging in social relations—in this case, confrontational relations, as each party wrestles
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for control over space, and thus, power. As the nature of these social relations change (as
one party or another gains the upper hand), so too does the nature of the space—what
Batuman deems “the urban fabric”.45 Thus, space and society have a reciprocal
relationship; because space must be socially reproduced, altering space has the capacity
to create social change. In essence, this means that political struggles enacted via public
space are worthwhile and significant strategies. Harkening back to Batuman’s original
assertion—that the TEKEL protest encampment was significant despite ultimately failing
in its political goals—we see that Batumans’ reasoning relies on tenets of Henri
Lefebvre’s The Production of Space: that “(social) space is a (social) product”.46
From Habermas to Soja, theorists have built upon each other’s contributions to
construct a body of work that details the origins, history, and nature of public space as
both construct and political process. Through this theoretical lens, we can explore how
urban space is organized for the benefit of some and the exclusion or repression of others,
shaping the landscape of social justice in the community. This review of the existing
literature serves as a framework for our exploration of the role of public art in
revolutionary moments in which citizens, en masse, challenged the authority and
legitimacy of the state through the seizure of public space, much like the TEKEL protests
in Turkey.
Most of the scholars discussed here have given ample attention to traditional
markers of societal development, like economic exchange and political participation.
However, analysis on the role of more creative action, such as art, remains somewhat
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absent from theories of public space. I argue that public art is a significant form of
participation in society and mechanism for shaping environments and thus should factor
into discussions of public space. Furthermore, since the initial publication of many of
these seminal works, public space has taken on new forms. Space is no longer always
physical, rather, new technologies and trends have redefined public space. For example,
the internet has provided a novel social space where these theorists’ arguments must be
re-examined and applied to new contexts. Likewise, globalization has challenged our
notion of a defined urban city and forces us to consider how public space operates across
the borders of nation-states. Nonetheless, these landmark works provide an important and
necessary theoretical framework for our exploration of public art in Egypt, Syria, and
Lebanon during times of political and social crisis.

Gender
Lastly, we must establish a theoretical grounding of gender in order to analyze
street art in protest. At its core, this thesis is about power relations—how communities
react to asymmetries of power, how states seek to exert power through violent
surveillance, and how the use of public space for cultural expression is a form of power.
The process of analyzing power relations is also a gendered process, as both are based in
questions of agency: Who has agency within a political system? Who has agency within
public spaces? Thus, this analysis of power relations must include an analysis of gender
relations. Gender is not something I am electing to study, but rather a necessary
component of the topic at hand. To omit a gendered analysis would constitute a major
blind spot in this thesis.
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First, we must understand that gender is an unavoidable category of analysis.
Anthropologist Maya Mikdashi writes that “the ungendered body does not exist.”47 Every
individual performs gender in some manner, to some extent. To exist within modern
society, every body is gendered, whether through the individual’s conscious choices to
conform or resist gender roles or through society’s ascribing of gender to an individual
based on assumptions about physical appearance and actions. In this sense, gender is akin
to class; Mikdashi argues that “the unclassed body does not exist,” either.48 Because both
gender and class are integral components to one’s social identity (whether the individual
desires that or not), “ungendered politics” and “unclassed politics” do not exist.49 In sum,
politics is a gendered process. Just as art and politics are inextricably linked, so too are
gender and politics. Given these two premises—that all bodies are gendered and that all
politics are gendered—and given that this thesis addresses the movement of bodies within
public space and their political relation to the state, this thesis is also a gendered
endeavor.
Furthermore, Mikdashi argues that allowing the idea of ungendered bodies to
persist “reaffirm[s] the positioning of normative male political practices as somehow
‘unmarked’50 and universal.”51 In other words, if we do not address gender, the default
understanding is that the male experience of political participation is standard and
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applicable to all. This is not necessarily true; women have often been viewed as the
markers of national identity, public morality, and cultural integrity in pivotal historical
moments (more on this later), making their political participation uniquely significant and
symbolic. Thus, omitting gender in this thesis would signal to the reader that the male
experience of artistic participation in the 2011 Arab uprisings was universal and allencompassing, would erase the contributions of Arab women to the protest movements,
and would assume that political participation and power relations are not already
gendered relations. Maya Mikdashi’s work helps us to understand that gender “is not an
analytic lens that can be withheld and deployed.”52 Rather, gender is an integral
component of the social and political structuring of human life, and thus, an unavoidable
element of this thesis.
Because gender is a part of social and political systems, it has also come to be an
essential equation in power dynamics. In Night to His Day, sociologist Judith Lorber
explains that gender “is a process of creating distinguishable social statuses.”53 These
statuses serve as a mechanism for the allocation and distribution of rights and
responsibilities within a society. Furthermore, “as a part of a stratification system that
ranks these statuses unequally, gender is a major building block in the social structures
built on these unequal statuses.”54 In addition to creating distinguishable statuses of
gender (i.e. that men and women are different), societies simultaneously create
hierarchical statuses of gender (i.e. that men are superior to women). The hierarchy of
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gender in turn manifests itself in larger structures and institutions—such as gender
inequality in the political or economic realms. This thesis grapples with the asymmetries
of power that existed between Arab citizens and the state. As we know, citizens’
experiences with socioeconomic and political inequality drove the popular protests in
2010 and 2011 that ultimately evolved into the Arab uprisings. As we examine various
ways in which these actors negotiated power (particularly in public spaces), we must not
forget that the struggle over power is also a gendered phenomenon. Because, as Lorber
claims, “gender is a major component of structured inequality,” this thesis must include
gender in an analysis of power dynamics.55
In addition to power dynamics, gender is also an important component of the
history of the Middle East and North Africa. Understanding how gender has functioned
throughout the historical trajectory of the region is essential to analyzing it in a
contemporary context. An examination of scholarship on gender in the Middle East
reveals two primary understandings of women: women as measures of modernity and
women as symbols of the nation.
Anthropologist Lara Deeb’s research on public piety in the Shi’i Muslim
community of Beirut, Lebanon reveals the extent to which women are perceived as
markers of modernity. Deeb argues that women take center stage in the production of an
“enchanted modernity” through the performance of public piety due to their visibility in
the community. Through interviews in the field, Deeb reveals that the community knows
women’s lives are “of both local and international concern” and that there is “local
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concern about international concern.”56 Where does this concern over women’s
projection of modernity come from? Deeb argues that this phenomenon has historical
roots in the “tendencies of both European colonizers and local elites to use the status of
women as a measure of the level of modern-ness.”57 Throughout history, “a particular
liberal western feminist notion of emancipation and liberation” has been used as a
“universal standard of measure” of modernity, implemented and perpetuated through
colonialist and orientalist scholarship.58 Because women bear the “burden of cultural
authenticity and the markers of public piety,” their participation in public life holds
particular significance for the community, the citizenry, and the nation.59 The ways in
which women interact with public arenas like political systems, urban spaces, and
community activism are shaped by the cultural responsibilities thrust upon them as
women.
Similarly, Beth Baron’s examination of women during the Nationalist period in
Egypt demonstrates the second understanding of women in Middle Eastern history:
women as symbols of the nation. In Egypt as Woman, Baron seeks to understand how
women were incorporated into the collective memory of the Egyptian national period.
She argues that “as the details of women’s political activism were suppressed or
forgotten, what remained, or were remembered, were female symbols.”60 Despite
significant and tangible contributions to national projects, Baron points out that women’s
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work is often understood as symbolic, rather than truly active participation. In particular,
Nationalist reformers harnessed the “emotive power of nationalism” through the use of
“family metaphors,” wherein women were equated to mothers of the nation.61 These
metaphors, however, exploited the position of women in service to the nationalist cause
and reinforced “family hierarchies based on age and gender.”62 As a result, Baron argues
that “women’s rights in the Middle East…emerge as part of a nation-state building, or in
reaction to it.”63 Thus, the history of the nation-state is also the history of women. As this
thesis explores the relations between individuals and the state (within the nation-state
system), it is invariably intertwined with issues of gender. To discuss the nation and
nationalism in the Middle East without discussing gendered power dynamics in addition
to the role of women would again render women as solely symbolic figures, obscuring
the unique and significant ways in which women interact with the state and thus shaped
its trajectory.
This thesis seeks to address the specific challenges faced by Arab women under
authoritarian regimes, recognize the powerful contributions of women activists and artists
to the collective struggles in the region, and avoid collapsing women to markers of
modernity and national identity. Throughout this thesis, I attempt to acknowledge the
power in women’s political participation and avoid reducing their activism to symbols of
national identity, modernity, public piety, or cultural authenticity. Highlighting the active
participation of women in popular movements becomes an avenue for exploring power
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relations and social asymmetries, further avoiding the gendered tropes outlined here and
illustrating the ways in which politics are inherently gendered.

Thematic Mapping
In this thesis, I will analyze examples of street art in three countries in the MENA
region, discussing the nature of the art and its political significance, in order to elucidate
four primary goals and outcomes of street art: the subversion of state authority, the
democratization of protest, the reckoning with violence, and the proliferation of
transnationalism.
In the first chapter, I will demonstrate the capacity for street art to circumvent and
subvert state authority by analyzing street art in Egypt in relation to the nation’s political
environment. By using methods that exist outside of the state’s oversight, artists
challenge the state’s seemingly inherent authority to dictate how structures of power are
formed, maintained, and reformed—therefore challenging the authority of the state itself,
and in turn, the state’s existence. Additionally, Egyptian street art will show that a rich
practice of protest art facilitates the democratization of protest, leading to true popular
revolutions. Because, as discussed previously, art exists outside of traditional state
avenues of redress, it is available to large portions of the population that are continually
shut out of civil society by authoritarian regimes’ exclusive hold on power.
In the second chapter, I will examine street art in Syria to argue that art is
uniquely able to capture the aesthetics of brutality and communicate the suffering
inflicted by violence in war-torn regions of the Middle East and North Africa. By virtue
of the art’s location amidst the unrelenting violence, particularly on the crumbling walls
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and barricades, this type of street art exists in direct conversation with the effects of
violent conflict. Artists harnessed the power of satire and dark humor to juxtapose the
forces of creation and destruction, provide a place for the people’s collective pain, and
reckon with the absurdity of the situation.
In the third chapter, I will show the extent to which the protests across the Middle
East and North Africa during 2010 and 2011 transgressed the borders of nation-states
through an examination of street art in Lebanon. Although Lebanon did not experience
the same kinds of revolutions as other nations such as Egypt and Syria, much of Lebanese
public art expressed solidarity with the revolutions and captured the sentiments and
demands of the revolutionaries. Lebanese graffiti and murals drew attention to the larger
themes that plagued many communities across the MENA region, such as the sense of
frustration with established systems, the constant presence of violence in daily life, and
the desires for a better future marked by peace, stability, and popular representation. The
cultural elements of transnationalism examined in this chapter will demonstrate the
importance of ground-up social movements in facilitating regional integration.
To conclude, I will argue that public art is a meaningful category of historical
analysis and should be recognized as a form of participatory politics and community
engagement. Studying creative activism further illuminates the power dynamics that
shape how citizens encounter and interact with the state apparatus and reveals alternative
forms of collective action. Finally, I will apply the concepts and arguments set forth in
this thesis to briefly examine the role of street art in our present-day context amidst the
global coronavirus pandemic. I will demonstrate that the visual process not only endures,
but in fact, is particularly significant in times of crisis and upheaval.
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Chapter I
Art as Revolution:
The State, the People, and the Public Sphere in Egypt

“There is a feeling that Downtown Cairo and Tahrir Square is our land…We need to say
that this is our place, and we can write whatever we want.”
–Ammar Abo Bakr, Egyptian artist

“We are all Khalid Said”
On June 6, 2010, two policemen dragged a young man from an internet café in
Alexandria and beat him to death before discarding his maimed body in the street. Four
days later, a Facebook page titled “Kullina Khaled Said” (We Are All Khaled Said)
ubiquitously emerged. The page contained mercilessly detailed photographs of Said’s
broken corpse and disfigured face. As the Facebook page grew in viral prominence,
people all over Egypt
knew his story. By mid-June, it had over 130,000 active members. The website continued
to serve as a mechanism for exposing police violence through photos, videos, and
testimonies. It also became a space for activists to communicate and organize. But it was
the broken, bruised, and bloody face of Khaled Said that became an iconic image,
representing the visceral reality of police brutality. This face haunted an entire populace.
This face ignited a revolution.
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The incident, of course, only ignited a revolution by awakening an existing
dissatisfaction among the Egyptian people which had been festering since the failure of
the liberal nation-state model in the mid-twentieth century. This sense of unrest
dramatically escalated under three decades of Hosni Mubarak’s rule.64 After assuming the
presidency in 1981, Mubarak largely continued the “liberalizing tendencies” of his
predecessor.65 By the 90s, Mubarak had consolidated his power through a single-party
system, ushering in a period of authoritarian rule. In particular, changes to election
procedures minimized public political participation and effectively ensured the failure of
opposition parties to secure seats in the People’s Assembly.66 Unfree elections and the
constriction of political expression, combined with foreign policy criticisms, fomented a
widespread sense of anger and distrust among the Egyptian populace.
Amid this unrest, state security forces beat a 28-year-old citizen to death in broad
daylight, giving the nation a face for their revolution, a martyr for their cause, and an
impetus to act.
On January 25th, 2011 hundreds of thousands of Egyptians flooded the streets of
Cairo and poured into Tahrir Square, chanting “The people want the fall of the regime.”
In addition to police brutality, Egyptians protested state-of-emergency laws, corruption,
high unemployment, inflation (especially of food prices), and low wages. While
protesters called for Mubarak’s resignation and an immediate end to emergency rule,

William L. Cleveland and Martin P. Bunton, “The 2011 Arab Uprisings and Their Aftermath,” A History
of the Modern Middle East, 4th ed. (New York: Routledge, 2016), 540.
65
Ibid., 540. “Liberalizing tendencies” refers to Mubarak’s (and other Arab leaders’) attempts to lift
restrictions on private industry and relax government regulations to reduce the state’s involvement in the
economy. This involved reducing government spending on social programs (health care and education, for
example) and selling state assets to elites allies of the regime.
66
Ibid.
64

28

their demands were part of a larger desire for civil liberties, political freedom, and social
justice. Beginning on what was a national police holiday, protesters demonstrated and
marched for eighteen straight days, culminating in the overthrow of the Mubarak regime.
Tahrir Square, once the site of important administrative buildings “symboliz[ing] Egypt’s
controlling bureaucratic state,” was dominated by nonviolent protest and civil
disobedience. Through the occupation of the Square, protesters transformed the major
public plaza into a hub of revolutionary activity.
Where Egyptians gathered in protest, art flourished. Take, for example, the
following piece of graffiti:
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http://dustanddreams.blogspot.com/2011/06/khaled-said-graffiti-sprayedon.html
Figure 1: “Have puppets come between your eyes like water? Do not
forget my blood-stained robe.” The text refers to the ways in which the
regime has blinded the population and turned people into puppets.

While this piece of graffiti could have depicted any Egyptian, it specifically depicts the
outline of Khaled Said. The widespread presence of Said’s face reminds us that his story
resonated with Egyptians precisely because of his everyman identity. Painted on the oneyear anniversary of his death, the graffiti reflects how Said lived on as a martyr and an
icon, sustaining the revolution long beyond his own death. This piece shows Said with his
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mouth covered by text. The artists’ choice to cover Said’s mouth suggests how dissidents
are silenced by the government through the use of police violence. As one can tell
aesthetically, this piece was created using a stencil and spray paint. Stencils were crucial
to the proliferation of street art because they made simple designs easily replicable and
could be painted quickly, facilitating an easy escape of the authorities. The fact that
Khalid Said’s face was transformed into a stencil further demonstrates just how
widespread his likeness had become. Furthermore, this piece was painted in front of the
Ministry of the Interior. The artist’s choice to place a revolutionary icon at a site of state
authority reveals the extent to which the creation of graffiti was a subversive act.
Protesters’ cooptation of key public spaces represented a direct affront to the state’s
control over public spaces and over the Egyptian people.
On February 11th, 2011, Hosni Mubarak resigned as President of Egypt and the
Supreme Council of Egyptian Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed control of the country. The
Council, comprised of high-ranking military and political officers, promised to transfer
power to the people and establish a democracy. In reality, however, the transition was a
year of “tortuous twists and turns that suggested the SCAF was intent on retaining real
power.”67 Then, despite the people’s achievement of overthrowing Mubarak’s
authoritarian regime, many questioned the revolution’s success when, after the
parliamentary elections of 2011 and the presidential election of 2012, the Muslim
Brotherhood rose to prominence.
In many ways, Egypt was a trendsetter for the Arabic-speaking region. As the
most populous country in the region, it led the Middle East and North Africa in terms of
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art, media, and public mobilization. In 2010 and 2011, Egyptians’ calls for economic
reform, social justice, and political freedom were echoed by other Arab protesters—both
in solidarity with Egyptians and for their own national causes. Creative elements of the
Egyptian uprising, from images to slogans, reverberated around the Middle East and even
internationally. Because of Egypt’s pioneering role in the region, it is the first case study
in this thesis. Egypt’s protest art reveals themes that are emblematic of the larger regional
shifts. Through an examination of Egyptian protest, we will establish important concepts
and frameworks for analysis that are essential to understanding Syrian and Lebanese
street art, as well.
Long after his murder, when other Arab states were in the throes of their own
revolutions, Khaled Said’s face remained a potent visual icon of the revolution. This
mural was painted in 2012, two years after the event itself.
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https://www.middleeasteye.net/features/khaled-said-five-years-state-egyptian-street-art
Figure 2: A mural depicting Khaled Said’s face after he was beaten to death by police.
Located near Tahrir Square in Cairo.
The mural’s graphic depiction of cuts, bruises, and blood captures the gruesome reality of
state violence. The artist’s choice to paint only the face and not the body reveals an
attempt to convey the emotional pain of living under an authoritarian state. The incredible
detail of Said’s face communicates the deeply personal implications of police brutality
and state abuse. The imposing size, as well, contributes to the sense that Said is a
looming figure who will live on in the spirit of the revolution until justice is achieved.
Even the fact that the artist created the mural in 2012, two years after Said’s death,
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reveals the extent to which his legacy persisted, continuing to inspire artists and
protesters long after his end on earth.
Building on the motifs and provocations for murals of Said, this chapter addresses
three ways in which street art illuminates key elements of the Egyptian uprisings of 2011:
first, the potential of street art, as an avenue of political participation, to circumvent and
subvert state authority; second, the ability for revolutionary art to democratize the process
of protest; and third, the capacity of street art to illuminate the gendered dynamics of state
violence and reactionary protest.
First, protesters used street art as a nontraditional means of protest to circumvent
state authority. By seeking redress through avenues outside of state control, protesters
effectively challenged the state’s authority to determine what political participation looks
like. Furthermore, by creating protest art in key public areas, Egyptians laid claim to the
right to occupy and control public space, therefore challenging the state’s authority to
regulate space. In total, these consequences effectively challenged the state’s legitimacy
as an institution of power.
Second, the widespread use of street art as a method of protest in the Egyptian
uprisings facilitated the democratization of protest. Khaled Said was certainly an iconic
figure in the Egyptian revolution, but he wasn’t a political leader. He was an ordinary
young Egyptian who became an unwitting martyr. He was, as scholar Marwan Kraidy
describes, a “floating signifier—a figure whose visibility matches the figure’s symbolic
pliability.”68 Said’s story encapsulates the nature of the Egyptian revolution at large: a
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predominately leaderless, truly democratic, popular uprising orchestrated and enacted by
the public.
Third, protest art made visible the gendered aspects of state violence and, in turn,
the ways in which protest as a process was a gendered phenomenon. The kinds of police
brutality that spurred the Egyptian revolution affected both men and women; women,
however, particularly faced systematic and institutionalized sexual violence, sanctioned
and perpetrated by the state. The specific ways in which women encountered the state
apparatus as women shaped their participation in the protest movement. Egypt’s city
walls reflected how women’s issues, while explicitly gendered, were also an integral
component of the revolutionary movement in totality.

Cultural Production as Political Revolution
Egyptian’s use of art in protest was a particularly useful tool to protest the
authoritarian state and demand democratic rule by and for the people. First, Egyptians
used street art to circumvent traditional political power, as defined by the state.
Protesters’ use of art asserted that cultural expression—both the product and the
process—are valid forms of political participation. Second, Egyptians used protest art to
subvert the state’s authority through the cooptation of public space. As artists lay claim to
public spaces, they undermine the state’s authority to control such spaces. Lastly, through
the use of art, Egyptians created an ongoing, self-perpetuating clash between the people
and the state. The creation of inherently subversive art led government forces to heighten
violent security measures—the precise actions against which the people were protesting.
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In turn, artists created more protest art, generating a darkly ironic cycle in which art
became a physical manifestation of shifting power dynamics between people and state.

Defining the Nation-State
Before examining how protest art subverted state authority through the people’s
reclamation of public space, we must first establish an understanding of the nation-state
as an institution of power. In 1951, political philosopher Hannah Arendt published The
Origins of Totalitarianism, in which she analyzes the institutions and operations of
totalitarian movements. Focusing on the anti-Semitism, imperialism, and rise of
totalitarian features within the nation-state paradigm from the early 1800s through World
War I, Arendt establishes a framework of the nation-state and how citizens and noncitizens interact with the nation-state as a legal institution. We can use Arendt’s theory to
understand Mubarak’s authoritarian state and the nature of Egyptians’ protest against it.
The nation-state is comprised of both a nation—a community of people formed on
the basis of a common identity (such as language, ethnicity, etc.)—and a state—a
politically organized sovereign body. Arendt’s definition of the nation-state inherently
critiques the very concept itself. She writes that the “conditions for the rise of nation
states” are “homogeneity of population and rootedness in the soil.”69 Because
homogeneity is a crucial precondition, the nation-state must be intrinsically exclusionary.
Territorially-bounded homogeneity must be manufactured through the exclusion and
subordination of minority groups. According to Arendt, “minorities within nation-states
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must sooner or later be either assimilated or liquidated.”70 Liquidation, of course, serves
as a euphemism for state-enacted systemic violence; genocide, ethnic cleansing, and
concentration camps are well known to Arendt’s readers in the 1950s.
The other option—assimilation—is not as peaceful as it may sound. Arendt bases
her discussion on the post-WWI Treaties which established new nations in Eastern
Europe. She explains that the treaties “lumped together many peoples in single states,”
thus encircling many groups within one state. Some of these peoples were entrusted to
govern while others were not given equal partnership in the government and still others
were deemed ‘minorities.’71 The imposition of the nation-state system upon Eastern
European communities via the Treaties was thus “an arbitrary game which handed out
rule to some and servitude to others.”72 Arendt thus embeds her definition of the nationstate with an unavoidable critique; the nation-state, as a political structure, is predicated
on the exclusion, whether through juridical or violent means, of certain groups.
The apparatus of the nation-state retains the sole power to determine and allocate
rights. Citizenship, therefore, is the right to have rights. For those who are denied
citizenship on the basis of the nation-state’s exclusionary foundation, they are continually
deprived of rights. Arendt argues that World War I proved “the constitutional inability of
European nation-states to guarantee human rights to those who had lost nationally
guaranteed rights.”73 Refugees that left their states became ‘stateless,’ and thus,
“rightless.”74 Because they “had no governments to represent them and to protect them,”
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stateless people lost even “those rights which had been thought of and even defined as
inalienable.” Because the nation-state is the only avenue through which one can secure
rights, there is no international body that can guarantee human rights. Arendt scorns the
idea of ‘human rights,’ calling it “hopeless idealism” and “feeble-minded hypocrisy.”75
To insist on the existence of human rights (not only as a concept but as a reality for
stateless peoples) is simply to refuse to acknowledge the nation-state’s power— it
innately exclusionary and destructive power.
Without international human rights as a safety net, what becomes of stateless
people? Arendt argues that the best way for a stateless person to regain the protection of
the law is actually to break that law. Arendt states that, in the case of statelessness (and
thus, rightlessness), “a criminal offense becomes the best opportunity to regain some kind
of human equality.”76 Because the nation-state is based on equality before the law, the
stateless person who commits a crime will nonetheless be treated as an equal; he is
afforded the same rights as a citizen.
In a totalitarian state, however, the principle of equality before the law breaks
down. It is in this moment that Arendt’s theory becomes crucial to understanding
revolutionary Egypt. Arendt argues that “the nation-state cannot exist once its principle
of equality before the law has broken down.” If, as Arendt claims, equality before the law
is essential to the functioning of the nation-state, then the rise of a totalitarian regime—in
which the principle of equality breaks down—is also the collapse of a nation-state. And
with that collapse, the state is unable or unwilling to provide the rights and protections
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afforded to citizens. As Mubarak consolidated his singular rule over Egypt through
corruption and authoritarian strategies, he denied the people their rights to political
participation, civil liberties, and social justice—including equality and protection under
the law. For three decades, Mubarak’s government maintained these structures of
totalitarian rule that disenfranchised and oppressed Egyptians. The government’s
violation of citizens’ rights represents the disintegration of the nation-state, as described
by Arendt.
Furthermore, Arendt argues that the disintegration of the nation-state (via the loss
of equality), lends itself to the rise of police rule. According to Arendt, police power and
totalitarian regimes are inextricably intertwined—a powerful police force is necessary to
execute totalitarian rule. In such circumstances, the people, “regardless of any offenses
committed…[find] themselves anyways beyond the pale of the law.”77 As a result, the
state becomes, in effect, “arbitrary rule by police decree.”78 Arendt’s argument conjures
up images of Egyptian life under Mubarak. Take, for example, Khaled Said: an Egyptian,
who, aside from some unconfirmed suspicions of petty drug dealing, was an ordinary
citizen. Part of the reason his death invoked such rage among the public was precisely
because it seemed like his fate could have been any of theirs, if they had only been so
unlucky. Protests against Said’s murder, along with other instances of police brutality,
only exacerbated conflict with the police. As Egyptians quickly encountered, “doing
politics outdoors brought citizens face-to-face with the caste that rules the streets: Egypt’s
ubiquitous police.”79 Thus, widespread public protests spurred further violent retaliation
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by the state, which in turn, generated more unrest. With Arendt’s theory as a foundational
understanding of the nation-state, totalitarianism, and policing, we will next investigate
the role of street art in circumventing state authority, subverting state legitimacy, and
generating an ongoing contest between the people and the state.

Circumventing the State
Since proper political channels had been corrupted by Mubarak’s authoritarian
practices, Egyptians were unable to use traditional means of political engagement. Enter:
street art. Protesting through art was a creative way to express desire for reform because
it existed entirely outside the scope of civic participation as dictated by the state. Instead
of adhering to established avenues of redress, such as electoral politics or legal recourse,
artists hijacked cultural practices for political and social purposes.
This process is what scholar Marwan Kraidy calls creative insurgency. He defines
creative insurgency as “the sum total process through which revolutionary subjects
extricate themselves from the body of the sovereign in order to create a new body
politic.”80 Kraidy’s choice of the word ‘extricate’—literally meaning to free, disentangle,
or extract—is key. Creative insurgents, including Egyptian street artists, sought to
disentangle the public from the government. By declining to participate in state-dictated
and state-controlled forms of political participation, artists removed the people from the
state and its institutions. Further, the creative insurgents extricate themselves from the
“sovereign”—i.e. the state which holds the supreme power or authority. By removing
themselves from the “body of the sovereign,” artists challenge the state’s seemingly
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inherent authority to dictate how structures of power are formed, maintained, and
reformed.
While appreciating the aesthetic magnificence of the art itself and the pointed
political message each piece can embody, it is important not to lose sight of the
significance of the process of cultural production. According to scholar Rounwah Adly
Riyadh Bseiso, we must consider “why and how people make art during the revolutionary
moment—as a unique historical process.”81 The use of creative forms of protest
demonstrates not only the extent to which the government has excluded the people from
traditional political participation, but also that cultural production is a form of political
participation. By using art as a political weapon, revolutionaries illustrated that culture is
political. Cultural expression, therefore, is political expression as well.
This idea has even larger ramifications when it comes to our conceptualizations of
politics and the future of scholarship. Bseiso argues that the revolution “affected the very
way we perceive not only power and politics, but also art and culture in a Middle Eastern
context.”82 Because the Egyptian revolution was as much cultural as it was political, the
process of creating street art in reaction to and in service to the revolution was also an
important moment for cultural production. Street art in the Egyptian protest movement
helped to solidify the idea that art and culture are inherent and essential components of
modern political life.
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Subverting the State
In addition to circumventing the state by using cultural expression as a form of
political expression, protesters also subverted the state. Graffiti itself challenges state
authority by defying law; “governments across the region—and indeed, globally—
consider it vandalism and sabotage.”83 By vandalizing, artists challenge the state’s ability
to maintain law and order and, thus, “undermine the state’s sense of public security.”84
Moreover, street art is subversive because it coopts public space. As artists use the
walls of the city as their canvases, they lay claim to public space. As established in the
introduction to this thesis, power is derived from control over space. Because the
organization of public space reflects social hierarchies, the domination of public space
becomes a tool for the maintenance of existing structures of power. When artists assert
the presence of the people in public spaces, they thus are enacting a form of protest—the
protest of the state’s jurisdiction over the urban landscape.
Through street art, such as graffiti and murals, the artist literally makes visible the
struggles of the people and illustrates their demands in the spaces that the state controls.
This reclamation of public space by and for the people is a direct affront to the state’s
authority to control that space. As Mark LeVine argues, the reason for “graffiti’s social
power is that it’s the most important medium and long-term indicator of who controls
physical space—the state or the opposition.”85 Calling this control into question thus
“undermines the state’s sense of public security.”86 The artists act as agents of change by
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coopting state-dominated public space, thus challenging the state’s right to control that
public space, and consequentially, challenging the legitimacy of the state apparatus itself.
The following piece of graffiti, for example, undermined the authority of the state
to police the people:

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/revolutionary-road-the-urbanshowcase-of-egypts-uprising-8202906.html
Figure 3: A young girl conducts a security search on a police officer. Located on
Mohamed Mahmoud Street in Cairo.
In this piece, the artist juxtaposes a young girl and an adult security officer, creating a
jarring visual for the viewer. The police officer, with his hands overhead and legs apart,
occupies a position of total surrender. The young girl, on the other hand, occupies a
position of power as she conducts a pat-down security check. By flipping the expected
power dynamic on its head, the artist has created a piece that is both ironic and thought-
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provoking. The image raises questions for the viewer: Who does have the right to police
bodies and why? Thus, by inverting the power dynamic, the piece subverts the state’s
authority to control citizens’ bodies through violating surveillance measures. The piece
asserts a reclamation of power by the people, as they (represented by the child) turn the
police officer’s own tools and tactics against him.
Furthermore, the location of this piece is particularly important to understanding
its significance; it was painted on Mohammed Mahmoud Street in central Cairo, near
Tahrir Square. This area of the city saw many of the public demonstrations that led to the
ousting of Mubarak and formed the Egyptian revolution. According to Sarah Awad and
Brady Wagoner, “occupying central places in the city ensures high visibility and infuses
the space with a revolutionary identity, showing it is not under full state control.”87 The
street, often called Martyr’s Road, became a particularly revolutionary space both
literally—through the protests held there—and symbolically—through its association
with the opposition movement. Thus, the location was likely an intentional choice by the
artist to contribute to the delineation of Mohammed Mahmoud Street as a public space
that the people had reclaimed from the state.
The presence of graffiti, especially sharply critical pieces like the one above,
marks the space in which it exists as a space that belongs to the people and to their
revolution. Through the reclamation of public space, artists subvert the state’s authority
to control key spaces, thus challenging the state’s legitimacy itself. Street art, therefore,
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ultimately creates a space for the collective imagining of a new type of political and
social structure for the nation.

Fighting a Perpetual Battle
In addition to circumventing and subverting the state, street art also sets up an
evolving confrontation between the people and the state. The intermittent government
efforts to prevent or erase graffiti represents the state’s attempt to reassert control over
the populace. These efforts, however, reinforce the people’s experiences with the state’s
restrictions on free speech and political expression. Thus, the state’s effort at censorship
spurs further frustration and unrest among the people, inspiring them to continue their
efforts at resistance and create more art. The state’s efforts are both unsuccessful and
self-defeating, as the graffiti inevitably returns, appearing sporadically via the clandestine
work of nameless individuals and groups. The further proliferation of subversive protest
art elicited further violent attempts by security forces to reassert control over the space
and the populace.
This back-and-forth between the people and the state serves as a physical
manifestation of the constantly shifting power dynamics of revolution. As Hanan Sabea
describes, “with every new wall that was erected around Tahrir…creative cultural
resistance intensified.”88 As a result, “Egyptian authorities unwittingly provided
revolutionary artists with a canvas.”89 The state’s attempt to regulate artistic protest
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simply reminded the people why they were protesting, reinforcing their commitment to
overthrowing the security apparatus that governed their existence. In service to the
revolutionary movement, protesters turned the oppressor’s own tactics and tools against
him. The strategies of these respective actors—the artists and the state—and their
reactions to each other’s strategies generated an ironic cycle of protest and crackdown.
The following image illustrates this phenomenon:

https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/28858/Intimidation-and-Resistance-ImaginingGender-in-Cairene-Graffiti
Figure 4: Security forces beat a protester, revealing her blue bra. Located on
Mohamed Mahmoud Street in Cairo.
The piece depicts the skewed power dynamics of Egyptian life under Mubarak’s
authoritarian regime. Three police officers, equipped with weapons, descend upon a
single unarmed protester, communicating the downright unfairness of the conflict.
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Protesters, unable to fight back in a literal sense, are forced to turn to symbolic strategies
such as art to enact the revolution.
Additionally, the positioning of the singular protester on the ground with the police
officers looking down on her from above is a physical illustration of the imbalance of
power that plagues the relationship between citizen and state. Furthermore, the police
officers are male and are attacking a female protester, which draws attention to another
axis of power that was present in the revolution (more on this coming later!). The
protester has been stripped of her abaya, a full-body garment that covers the entire body
of a woman, aside from her face, hands, and feet, revealing her undergarments. The
depiction of the protester literally stripped illustrates how Egyptians were stripped of
their rights to engage safely and democratically with the political process, thus requiring
the people turn to unconventional means of protest.
While this piece of graffiti certainly elicits anger and fear in the viewer, it also
hints at the power of the people. Just as the first image, this piece was painted on
Mohammed Mahmoud Street near Tahrir Square, exemplifying the reclamation of key
public spaces by protesters. Additionally, the security forces are faceless and identical,
demonstrating a lack of individual identity and humanity. They are simply
representations of the state’s authoritarian reach and violent practices. The protester, on
the other hand, has a face, which demonstrates her humanity and elicits sympathy from
the viewer. Her outstretched hand shows that she will continue to resist the state’s violent
tyranny, even as she is in a nearly hopeless position. Her small action holds significant
power in this moment. The protester in this piece reflects Egyptian protesters persistent
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efforts to assert their demands through whatever means are available to them, regardless
of how powerful and all-encompassing the state apparatus may seem.

The Democratization of Protest
Wael Ghonim, one of the creators and administrators of the “We Are All Khalid
Said” Facebook page, said: “In revolutions before, there was a Ghandi, there was a
Martin Luther King. In our revolution, there wasn’t. What there was, were a lot of
faceless, nameless individuals who all collaborated and communicated and reached
toward their goals—without a leader.”90 Ghonim captures the sentiment of many
Egyptians’ experiences in what can be described as a leader-less uprising. The Egyptian
revolution of 2011 was a revolution made by the masses and an example of the power of
collective action. This is a phenomenon I will call democratization. Art, in particular, was
a central tool in democratizing protest. This section will discuss four main characteristics
of street art that facilitated the democratization of protest in the Egyptian Revolution:
first, participating in protest through art is a means that is accessible for people excluded
from traditional forms of civic participation; second, because street art exists in highly
visible public spaces, it serves as mode of communication among the people to generate a
public discourse; third, street art exists outside of the ‘culture industry’ in which art is
commodified and valued based on its ability to be bought and sold in capitalist markets;
and lastly, modern technology played a crucial role in circulating revolutionary images to
a wide audience.
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Defining Democratization
Before delving in to the ways in which street art facilitated the democratization of
protest in Egypt, we must first establish a definition of ‘democratization.’
Democratization in this sense does not refer to democracy as a political philosophy or
political structure. Rather, I use the term to describe the process by which protest
becomes accessible to the broad masses of the people in a relatively equitable manner. In
The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest, Hanan Sabea highlight the presence of this
theme within many of the Arab uprisings. They use the term “horizontality,” which is
characterized by “non-privileged, egalitarian listening to others and allowing to speak in
turns.”91 The nature of the Egyptian revolution similarly lacked a singular or all that
powerful leader and, instead, relied on the inclusion of all Egyptians and the creation of a
public discourse among the people.
Moreover, an historical perspective of Egyptian social and political life is
necessary in order to establish context for the 2011 uprisings. Scholars Joel Beinin and
Marie Duboc investigate how over two million Egyptian workers participated in
collective actions, such as strikes or factory occupations between 2004 and 2010. They
argue that these demonstrations were able to bring together many sectors of the working
class—from private sector to civil service—because they were all acting in response to
neoliberal economic restructuring. The imposition of a neoliberal order in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries had harmful ramifications for the livelihoods of
working-class Egyptians. Because these changes had to do with the entire structure of the
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national political economy, they affected a critical mass of the Egyptian population. As
workers’ felt that their rights and economic security were threatened, they “profoundly
transformed Egyptian political culture” by mobilizing in protest.92 The political
mobilization of the worker’s movement illustrates the “possibilities for collective action
and movement-building in a resource-poor, authoritarian environment.”93 Thus, we can
use Beinin and Duboc’s examination of the workers’ movement as a framework for
understanding the democratization of protest.
While the explosive demonstrations took place in early 2011, the popular
mobilization that made them possible was years in the making. The earlier workers’
efforts contributed to what Beinin and Duboc call a “burgeoning culture of protest in the
2000s.”94 This culture proved that social movements could “successfully [assert their]
public presence in an authoritarian state that imposed severe limits on associational
life.”95 Whether or not protesters’ demands were ultimately met was not guaranteed, but,
at the very least, the workers’ movements served as an initial glimpse of the potential
power of collective action, even within environments where that power is meant to be
explicitly neutralized. Thus, the workers’ protests essentially provided a framework for
successive collective actions that manifested in the 2011 uprisings.
Furthermore, when the 2011 uprisings did occur, workers’ associations were
quick to lend crucial support. Between January 28th and February 5th of that year,
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“production in key industrial zones dropped by 60 percent” due to workplace strikes.96
Actions on the part of workers’ propagated a climate of unrest, which ultimately put
enough pressure on the state to make key concessions. The perspectives of workers’
associations and labor activists also helped to communicate the broader message of the
revolution; protesters demanded not only the resignation of Mubarak, but also more just
social and economic policies.
In fact, according to scholar Mona El-Ghobashy, workers’ protests were often
explained away as purely economic issues, not political ones. However, in reality,
workplace protest formed a crucial component of the political mobilizations in January of
2011. El-Ghobashy argues that the initial success of the Egyptian revolution was due to
the unification of the three main protest sectors: workplace protest, neighborhood protest,
and associational protest. These three protest subcultures “had been practicing collective
action for at least a decade, acquiring organizational experience,” which contributed to
the protesters’ success during the pivotal days of public demonstration from January 25th
to 28th.97 As millions took to the streets to demand Mubarak’s resignation, their success
in evading the state’s domination relied on “diffusion and linkage.”98 The diffusion of
protest across all segments of the Egyptian population and the linkage between the three
protest sectors were essential in mobilizing the public towards revolution.
The demonstrations of January 2011 were successful in achieving their immediate
demands precisely because the three protest sectors—encompassing a large portion of the
population from different demographics—united in their objective and took to the streets.
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As El-Ghobashy aptly summarizes, it was “the one and only time that Egypt’s three
protest subcultures were able to jointly defeat the coercive apparatus that had existed to
keep them apart.”99

Art’s Accessibility
The rich practice of street art facilitated the democratization of protest by
providing Egyptians with an opportunity to participate in the uprising in a logistically
feasible manner. Because, as discussed previously, art exists outside of traditional state
avenues of redress, it serves as a means of political expression particularly available to
those that lack political or social power and thus are continually excluded from
conventional means of civic participation. As Mark LeVine notes, “art is especially
important where civil society has little space for protest or to otherwise challenge the
power of repressive regimes.”100 In a political environment such as Egypt, wherein
authoritarian regimes have a near exclusive hold on power, huge portions of the populace
are marginalized, and thus, must turn to the tools available: street art.
The types of art used as protest are literally accessible to most of the population
because they don’t require much material, time, or expertise. Graffiti requires only a
spray paint bottle and a few minutes. It is not considered a prestigious, or, according to
some, even a legitimate art form, and thus does not require much artistic skill or training.
In particular, using stencils facilitates the proliferation of iconic images and graphics,
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which succinctly mark a space as revolutionary. The quick process of stenciling, as well,
lends itself to evasion of the authorities.
Furthermore, street art erodes the barrier between creator and viewer. Graffiti is
often created anonymously. In this sense, it is distinct from most other art forms in which
artists seek recognition and praise. Stencils, in particular, are often hastily and covertly
spray painted. Thus, the focus of street art is not on the creator; in fact, it “can take the
‘originator’ out of the equation” entirely.101 As a result, street art “undermine[s] the
attribution of creativity and genius to a single individual” and resituates it with the
people.102 The people, therefore, are jointly responsible for the revolutionary messages
espoused in the artworks. The creation of street art, thus, is a process “reuniting makers
and their audiences,” defying generational, gendered, or socioeconomic boundaries.103
While simple pieces of graffiti and stenciled graffiti illustrate this point most
obviously, murals and other, more detailed artworks also facilitate the democratization of
protest by involving viewers. In interviews with Egyptian street artists, Rounwah Adly
Riyadh Bseiso found that artists intentionally tried to elicit “any reaction and involvement
by the public” because it “meant that they were successful in fostering an interactive
(versus one-directional) art that embodied collective and popular sentiments.”104
In Egypt, anonymous and collectively-created street art especially flourished in
the initial eighteen days of the revolution. According to Bseiso, this artistic explosion in
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the streets “served to deconstruct the idea that the political was the realm of the few.”105
This notion of collective cultural creation enacted through massive public participation
continued to breathe life into the revolution well beyond the resignation of Mubarak,
sustaining the people’s spirit for months and years to come.

Public Spaces, Public Discourse
In addition to its literal accessibility, protest art existed in public spaces, thus
transforming the street into an avenue of communication and generating a revolutionary
discourse among the people. In an authoritarian environment where public
communication is limited—through restrictions on assembly, the erection of physical
barricades, and censorship of press and media—the street became the vessel for
communication among revolutionaries and between the people and the state. Protest art
that existed in highly trafficked public spaces, such as Tahrir Square and the surrounding
areas of Cairo, lent visibility to the people’s revolutionary sentiments and became the
natural space for the formation of a collective conversation.
From a psychological and sociological perspective, art is a form of
communication that does not rely on linguistic or discursive structures. As Robert E.
Innis notes, art is “made up of multiform symbolic structures functioning as tools of
communication.”106 These symbolic structures create a shared experience among viewers
and between artist and viewer. The result is art as a “universal mode of language.”107

105

Ibid., 347.
Robert E. Innis, “Resisting Forms: Prolegomena to an Aesthetics of Resistance,” Street Art of
Resistance, eds. Sarah H. Awad and Brady Wagoner, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 64.
107
Ibid., 80.
106

54

The presence of street art, acting as a form of communication in public spaces,
thus facilitates the formation of a collective consciousness. In Street Art of Resistance,
Vlad Petre Glaveanu argues that “the use of art in social change serves primarily the
purpose of fostering wonder, and, through it, cultivating the possibility of creative
action.”108 Not only does street art foster wonder for individual viewers, it fosters the
critical element of revolutionary movements: collective wonder. Because artists use
mirroring techniques wherein viewers can see elements of themselves, their communities,
and their values in the artwork, street art makes “people experience wonder together.”109
Both the art itself and the collaborative process of production, observation, and
dissemination generate a collective consciousness for the discussion of present injustices
and a collective imagining of a better future. Street art, serving as a public discourse, thus
is a way of forming a new, revolutionary collective identity created by and for the people.
The following artwork illustrates Egyptian street art’s role in fostering a public
discourse.
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http://alaa-awad.com/murals_mohamed-mahmoud-street_cairo_egypt
Figure 5: ‘Women in Mourning’ by Alaa Awad depicts an ancient Egyptian funeral
tradition. Located on Mohamed Mahmoud Street in Cairo.
Egyptian artist Alaa Awad created this piece in response to the Port Said massacre on
February 1, 2012 in which 72 attendees of a football match were killed in a police-aided
clash between spectators. It is thus pertinent to note that Awad created this mural on
Mohammed Mahmoud Street which leads to the Ministry of Interior where the Egyptian
police force resides. The mural depicts an ancient Egyptian funeral tradition. This neopharaonic style draws upon the collective history and collective culture of the nation.
Women, carrying black flowers as a symbol of their mourning, weep and reach out to the
martyr. We can see the door of Osiris, which one passes through on one’s way to the
afterlife. The goddess of the sky, Nut, welcomes the martyr into heaven. The women,
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with hands outstretched towards the deceased, represent the strength in collective sorrow
and the power of collective action for healing. By giving visual form to Egyptian’s
mourning, Awad created a space in which the people can grieve their loss collectively,
engage in public discourse about the realities of violence in a police state, and
collectively imagine a route to a safer, more peaceful future.

Not for Sale
Street art, especially graffiti, inherently subverts the concept of art itself. Street art
raises the question: what is art? How do we define art and assess its value? Conventional
art that exists in galleries for aesthetic purposes contributes to an artistic culture that is
inaccessible and irrelevant to ordinary people. This kind of ‘high culture’ art is often
distant from the lived experiences of the people. It is not relevant to the political and
economic struggles that define their daily lives.
However, street art—often made cheaply, anonymously, and housed on the
streets—defies this traditional definition of art. According to Bseiso, it has the potential
“to liberate hegemonic narratives of what constitutes cultural production.”110 The use of
art as a protest strategy expands the definition of art, moving it from a restricted domain
in which only aesthetically impressive art created by professionally trained artists is a
valid work of art towards a definition of art that encompasses the contributions of
ordinary people expressing their struggles, desires, and demands through artistic avenues.
Street art emancipates artists from creating work that only contributes to further defining
the rigid boundaries of what art can look like.
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Furthermore, street art exists outside of the culture industry in which art is
commodified and valued based on its ability to be bought and sold. It is “one of the very
few art forms that would be able to maintain (if it wanted) its independence from the
market.”111 This form of art is not made to serve capitalist economic structures and the
neoliberal political ideologies that often accompany it. Scholar Thomas Teo argues that,
in neoliberal environments, there is an inverse relationship between money and
resistance: “the less that money is involved in art the higher the resisting affordances.”112
Thus, street art is revolutionary in its political message, but also in its existence as a valid
cultural contribution.
This idea is especially important considering Egypt’s historical legacy, as
previously discussed, of popular protest in response to neoliberal economic restructuring.
Art, therefore, offers the people an apt form of protest because, by using street art, they
refuse to concede to a type of protest that serves the neoliberal political and economic
structures against which they are protesting. It is as feminist activist Audre Lorde wrote:
the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.

From the Street to Social Media
In addition to its physical accessibility, street art served as means to participate in
protest for a majority of Egyptians through its online presence. In general, technology
such as cell phones and social media platforms played a crucial role in the Egyptian
uprising. It was, after all, a Facebook page condemning police brutality that gave traction
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to anti-regime sentiments. As Said’s story went viral, others like his emerged, complete
with cell phone videos of police brutality. These messages helped to ignite a
revolutionary fervor throughout the nation. Most Egyptians had access to the internet and
had social media accounts, and thus, access to the networking potential that comes with
modern technology. When it came time for the protests themselves, “cell phones were
especially important for demonstrators to spread news of protest diffusion in real time,
and to share spot instructions or eleventh-hour location changes.”113 El-Ghobashy argues
that the success of the 2011 protests was explicitly due to the collaboration and
instantaneous communication between the three protest subcultures—a feat made
possible only through the use of technology.
Technology such as social media allowed people to participate in protest without
engaging in a physical sense. Millions of people shared photos and graphics raising
awareness of the issues and symbolizing their support for the protests. Technology
allowed artists’ iconic images to move beyond the street, extending revolutionary
messages nationally, regionally, and globally. Thus, even those who were unable to
participate in the revolution through the creation or viewing of street art in public places
were able to view and circulate images of the art via social media. In Twitter and
Teargas, Zeynep Tufekci argues that the internet and social media “acts as a de facto
public sphere,” albeit one that can be subject to a degree of state surveillance.114 Thus,
social media functions as a forum of communication similar to the way in which the
street does—both generating discourse among the people, providing a space (whether
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literal or figurative) for collective wonder, and inspiring and coordinating collective
action.
A plethora of scholarship created since 2011 has addressed the importance of
technology, especially social media, in enacting the Egyptian revolution and other
concurrent uprisings throughout the Middle East and North Africa. While technology was
certainly a valuable tool for protests, we must not overstate technology’s role in
facilitating the uprisings. Tufekci notes that the uprising had “cultural and political roots
that predate the internet but have found a fuller expression in conjunction with the
capabilities provided by technology.”115 The people enacted the Egyptian revolution and
used technology as a tool of communication. Technology itself does not have agency; the
agency to create revolutions lies with the people. Egyptians used social media to amplify
their existing grievances and demands.
The ways in which art in public spaces facilitates the democratization of protest
by establishing a space for collective wonder, a people’s discourse, and the formation of a
collective identity separate from the state is replicated online. The internet becomes an
additional space where street art’s power can be witnessed and felt. The following image
reflects how art can quickly expand from the street to social media, as both spaces serve
as public forums for revolutionary sentiments:
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https://www.facebook.com/R4B%C4%B0A-576662552390129/
Figure 6: The four-fingered Rabia salute.
From July to August of 2013, Egyptian protesters staged a sit-in in Rabaa al-Adawiya
Square in Cairo to protest the military coup that removed President Mohammed Morsi of
the Muslim Brotherhood and stifled the democratic process started in the January 2011
revolution. On august 14th, Egyptian security forces stormed the square, shooting
protesters and spraying teargas, ultimately killing more than 800 unarmed Egyptian
civilians—an event that became known as the Rabaa Massacre. In response, protesters
created the image above. The four fingers refer to the word rabba, meaning ‘the fourth,’
and commemorate the name of the square in which the massacre took place. The symbol,
which originated with “Cairene minibus drivers who made the hand gesture to announce
the square as their destination, can be interpreted as “a symbolic defense mechanism
against the all-seeing and tyrannical eye of the Egyptian military state.”116 The ‘fourfingered salute,’ as it came to be known, was shared widely on social media platforms by
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Egyptians to honor the protesters and those who died at the hands of the government.
While the event was one that related exclusively to Egyptian politics, the image quickly
traveled across the Arab region. The prolific sharing of the image, accompanied by calls
“to turn Facebook yellow” throughout the Middle East and North Africa, showed
solidarity for the Egyptian people and their fight against violent authoritarianism. The
simple design allowed millions to participate in its recreation—which was, in itself, a
revolutionary action.

Women’s Protest: A Revolution Within the Revolution?
Because politics is a gendered process, an analysis of asymmetries of power
would be incomplete without an analysis of gender. If we do not address gender, we thus
reinforce the notion of the hegemonic male experience. To omit an analysis of gender
would be to assume that the male experience of participation in the Egyptian revolution
was universal and all-encompassing, which is not only untrue, but also damaging to
women’s presence in historical narratives. This section will investigate how Egyptian
street art reflected three main aspects of gender and protest. First, Egypt’s city walls
reflected how women’s issues, while explicitly gendered, were an integral component of
the revolutionary movement in its whole. The state’s unwillingness to adequately address
gender-based violence and, oftentimes, the state’s complicity in and perpetration of such
violence formed a major demand for political and social revolution. Second, regardless of
the uprising’s origin, protest itself was a gendered process. The specific ways in which
women encountered the state apparatus as women shaped their participation in the
revolution. Last, the use of feminist street art allowed protesters to claim a space for
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women as complete political citizens, as valid revolutionary participants, and as equal
members of the future collectivity.

Women’s Causes as Revolutionary Causes
Abuses against women were a driving force in the initiation of popular protests
that formed the Egyptian Revolution. Women’s issues were not simply an addendum to
the uprisings, opportunely raised amidst social and political upheaval. Rather, women’s
issues formed an integral part of the reasons for the initial protests themselves. Women’s
experiences of harassment, inequality, and violence were essential in fomenting the
widespread sense of discontent that was a necessary precondition for revolution.
In Egypt, specifically in urban centers such as Cairo, sexual harassment and
assault became “a social epidemic.”117 To some extent, the issue had to do with social
scripts of sexual behavior and cultural expectations of masculinity and femininity.118
Women’s safety, gender-based violence, and sexual assault was also an explicitly
political issue because the ways in which the state was implicated in the phenomenon.
Beyond cultural and social messages, Egyptian women faced systematic and
institutionalized gender-based violence, sanctioned and perpetrated by the state. Not only
did the state fail to protect women citizens from violence, they were complicit in the
maintenance of systems and structures that imposed this violence. Furthermore, in many
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instances, security forces—representatives of the state—enacted sexual violence against
women as a political disciplinary measure. It is no surprise then, that “sexual defiance
emerged alongside political rebellion” in the 2011 protests.119
Sexual violence by the state was largely enacted through virginity examinations
carried out by male security forces and police offers. Virginity examinations have no
medical basis. These tests are rapes protected under the guise of medical jargon and legal
doctrine. In 2011, a young Egyptian woman named Samira Ibrahim Mohamed pressed
charges against the military officers who violated her via a virginity examination. She
was subjected to this violent procedure “for simply showing up in a political march on
the street.”120 While Mohamed was successful in obtaining a court order halting the
practice of virginity testing in the Egyptian civil court, the perpetrators were exonerated
in a military court the following year. The military apparatus had grown so powerful that
it had overtaken any semblance of legal justice. Thus, the military, the government
administration, and the surveillance state these actors created had become a serious threat
to the livelihoods of Egyptian women. Mohamed’s case reveals the extent to which the
state was involved in the maintenance and execution of a violent system that had
explicitly gendered implications. Thus, the safety of Egyptian women was not only a
social issue and a human issue, but also a political issue.
As state-controlled avenues of redress achieved only a semblance of justice, some
Egyptian women turned to creative methods of protest. On October 23, 2011 a young
Egyptian activist named Aliaa al-Mahdy posted a nude photograph of herself on her blog,
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A Rebel’s Diary. The photo, in which al-Mahdy wears only stockings and a red flower in
her hair, received over two million hits, catapulting her to international attention. AlMahdy wrote that the photo, and her blog, are “screams against a society of violence,
racism, sexism, sexual harassment and hypocrisy.”121 Her pairing of these issues together
reveals how gendered issues were inextricably connected to broader revolutionary
themes. Her photo thus serves as a critical juncture for several key concepts, whose
intersection culminated in the Egyptian uprisings and formed the heart of the
revolutionary struggle.
While al-Mahdy’s post was heralded as a courageous radical act by some, she also
received plenty of criticism from conservatives and liberals, Islamists and secularists
alike. Many condemned al-Mahdy for violating the boundaries of decency and morality
by exposing her nude body to the world. This criticism itself is rooted in sexism, as nude
male bodies did not and would not receive the same backlash.122 Moreover, the criticism
assumes that women are symbolic figures representing the moral health of the nation or
the culture in question. Others argued that Egyptians should focus on creating political
change first, as it was the most imminent concern. Blogger Kodr Salameh called on
Egyptian women to “’accept the incremental nature of change,’” arguing that al-Madhy
should not attempt to instigate a “’sexual revolution’” in a country “that has been unable
to complete a single political revolution.’”123 However, these critics missed a major
component of al-Mahdy’s message: that issues of sex and gender were invariably tied to
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political demands; for example, the state’s use of police brutality to enforce military rule
often manifested as sexual violence against women. Al-Mahdy’s protest demonstrated
that gendered issues could not be ignored in pursuit of political revolution. Still others
criticized al-Mahdy for mimicking Western feminism, arguing that her form of protest
was “inauthentic” to the social and cultural context and simply “too radical for Egypt.”124
This disagreement with al-Mahdy’s strategy, rather than message, reveals how feminist
protest in the Egyptian revolution came from variable approaches and took many
different forms.
While recognizing that women’s issues played an integral role in the Egyptian
uprising, we must also recognize that feminism was (and is) a diverse, complex, and
contested landscape. The term feminism is a floating signifier; its meaning shifts based on
the context and the observer. Problematically, the term feminism often connotes a
mainstream, also called ‘whitestream,’ definition of feminism which prioritizes, defends,
and centers whiteness and, thus, excludes and oppresses the voices and interests of
women of color. Furthermore, there exists an erroneous yet widespread narrative that
Islam itself is inherently anti-feminist. Both of these harmful notions are rooted in the
long history of “colonial feminism,” a term coined by Islamic feminist scholar Leila
Ahmed.125 Therefore, women in the Middle East and North Africa have constantly
negotiated their association with gendered agency and justice against Western definitions
of feminism. In Being Muslim, Sylvia Chan-Malik notes that some women reject
identifying themselves as feminists because of “their wariness with whiteness-invested
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“feminism” and its attendant logics of racism, classism, U.S. exceptionalism, and now,
anti-Muslim bias.”126 Nonetheless, such women employ alterative discourses and
frameworks such as womanism, socialist feminism, and Third World feminisms. Thus,
Egyptian women navigate complex matrices of power in their struggle for gendered
justice and deploy “a multilayered discourse that allows them to engage with and criticize
various individuals, institutions, and systems that limit and oppress them.”127
The variable and contested nature of feminism reminds us that one Egyptian
woman’s experience cannot stand in for the experiences of all Egyptian women. This idea
is present in the differences between Mohamed and al-Mahdy’s protests. Mohamed
sought redress for a specific type of violation, while al-Mahdy’s online post refused to be
collapsed to a single person, government administration, or political system. Mohamed’s
target was the individual officers who performed the virginity examination, who
represented the military and the security system at large. Al-Mahdy, on the other hand,
lacked an explicit target, instead addressing the political systems, social structures, and
cultural customs that prevented her from exercising the full extent of her gender and
sexual expression. Mohamed engaged with Egyptian legal courts, while al-Mahdy
engaged with millions of online viewers across the globe. While al-Mahdy’s approach
and Samira Ibrahim Mohamed’s certainly differed, both actors engaged in a meaningful
form of feminist protest—alongside and central to revolutionary protest.
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The following image of street art in Cairo exhibits the multifaceted nature of
women’s voices in the uprisings:

https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/what-the-egyptian-revolution-can-offermetoo/
Figure 7: A woman defends herself, alongside text which reads “no harassment.”
Located in Cairo.
This piece of street art in Cairo, photographed in 2013, depicts a woman defending
herself from sexual harassment or violence. The woman projects power: through her wide
stance, outstretched arms, and bold red dress, she symbolizes a celebration of female
autonomy. Her target is multiple small stick figures which suggest that there is no one
individual or entity that perpetrates this harassment, rather, that it is a widespread
phenomenon within her society and the institutions that structure that society. The
woman herself is a fascinating study in feminism: while she wears high heels, which are
typically associated with “Western” women (albeit sometimes seen as a cruel tool of the
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male oppressor by western feminists), her style of dress covers her entire body and head.
Yet despite being covered, her dress still allows the viewer to see the contours of her
body, eliciting a sense of careful rule-breaking. Perhaps the artist attempts to invoke
tropes of “Western” feminism and assumptions about Arab feminism in order to place
each in conversation with one another. Because her physical manifestation is ambiguous,
the woman represents multiple versions of Egyptian feminism and shows how these
multiple versions can exist simultaneously and coexist productively. She defends herself
using a can of pepper spray or mace, which, interestingly, looks quite similar to a can of
spray paint—the main tool of street art. This subtle yoking of weapon and art (whether
intended by the artist or not) highlights the power of street art as a weapon of protest.
This image is just one of the multitudes of graffiti and murals that existed in Egypt
depicting women’s struggles and women’s liberation alongside political messages. The
use of street art as a tool for political protest, such as anti-regime messages and
revolutionary sentiments, and the use of street art as a tool for feminist protest
communicates the connection between political and gender-based protest—again,
echoing the centrality of women’s voices to the Egyptian revolution.

Women as Protesters
In addition to the gendered nature of revolutionaries’ political demands, the act of
protesting itself had gendered implications. The ways in which women encountered the
state apparatus as women reveals that protest was a gendered process. As protesters
sought to reclaim authority over public space through the creation of street art and public
demonstrations and occupations, women’s experiences in protest demonstrated why these
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actions were so revolutionary. Distinct from the contributions and sacrifices of many
male protesters, the abuses suffered by female protesters were acutely symbolic and
significant.
Because women were already under strict discipline by the state through the
restriction of full rights to female citizens and the regulation of female bodies through the
enforcement of styles of dress, the presence of women in the public sphere was
particularly meaningful to the revolutionary movement. As the state sought to limit
women’s political participation and sexual expression through these strategies, the public
sphere—over which revolutionaries and the state battled for control —was thus “hostile
to a woman’s sexually and politically provocative body.”128 Furthermore, as discussed in
the introduction to this thesis, women have often been seen as symbolic representatives of
the moral virtue of their culture or nation. As mothers and daughters of the nation, female
protesters thus carried an added significance which “made their activism more tenuous
and perilous than men’s.”129 This kind of dangerous activism put women’s bodies, in
particular, at risk. Because women’s bodies often served as a site for battles of cultural
and national identity, instances of abuse against female protesters women’s bodies were
distinctly harrowing—and thus, readily transformed into further inspiration for the
revolution.
Moreover, because women are the marked category while men are the unmarked
category, women’s involvement in protest movements was always understood as
women’s protest, not just as protest. In other words, female revolutionaries’ protest could
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never be extracted from the revolutionaries’ femaleness. To see this phenomenon in
action, we look to revolutionary martyrs. Scholar Marwan Kraidy observes that “most
revolutionary martyrs-at-large were dead and clothed men, whereas the emergence of
women as icons in the Arab uprisings tended to result from their disrobement.”130 Female
protesters who suffered disrobement at the hands of state security forces became
revolutionary martyrs symbolizing the terror imposed by the state particularly because
they were stripped of their clothing, signaling their femaleness. Male protesters, on the
other hand, became martyrs symbolizing the very same terror, but because of the violence
they endured, not because of a gendered implication of that violence.
The incident of the ‘blue bra girl’ and the ensuing graffiti, such as pictured blow,
illustrate how women’s protest was distinct from men’s in the Egyptian revolutionary
context.

https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/revolution-to-revolution/
Figure 8: ‘No to Stripping the People’ by Bahia Shehab depicts the famous blue bra icon.
Located in Cairo.
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This piece of graffiti depicts the blue bra of a protester. On December 17th, 2011,
Egyptians gathered in Tahrir Square to protest the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces,
which took control after Mubarak resigned. Among them was an unidentified woman
who was severely beaten by security forces as she attempted to flee the square. Video
footage revealed that, as the officers dragged the woman, her abaya fell away to reveal
her jeans and blue bra underneath. The image of the iconic blue bra proliferated across
the streets of Egypt, as artists used stencils to quickly and easily replicate it, transforming
it into a symbol of the revolution.
Many male protesters had suffered the same, if not objectively worse, abuses by
security forces as the blue bra girl (after all, blue bra girl survived, while many other
protesters did not). So why did the blue bra become an iconic symbol of the revolution?
The answer lies in the particularly gendered aspect of this woman’s protest. The bra, an
already symbolic garment of womanhood, became a clear message of the state’s
depravity, “revealing the depths to which the Egyptian state would go in abusing the
bodies of citizens if they dared to rebel.”131 Furthermore, because women had been
designated as representatives of the nation’s well-being, revolutionaries interpreted the
attack on the blue bra protester as “an attack on Egyptian women, on the persons of
activists, and on the revolutionary movement as a whole.”132 The courageous protest of
the blue bra woman and the violent backlash she suffered came to be understood as a
symbol of the revolutionary movement’s capacity for action in the face of oppressive
discipline by the state, serving to reignite and sustain protesters’ revolutionary fervor.
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Women as Citizens
In addition to illustrating the gendered aspects of the revolutionaries’ agenda and
of the protest process itself, an examination of feminist street art reveals the gendered
nature of citizenship in revolutionary Egypt. Just as Egyptians used street art to assert
their right to public space, women used feminist street art to assert their right the public
sphere. Female artists and art centered on the female experience served as an attempt to
claim a space for women as valid revolutionary participants and, thus, as full and equal
political citizens.
Herein lies a tension between women as they have unfortunately been
traditionally understood as props in national battles versus women as valid revolutionary
participants and equal political citizens. According to Marwan Kraidy, women’s
involvement in the Egyptian uprising raised “the crucial question of whether women, and
not only men, can be the neutral, prototypical citizen.”133 Thus, the exclusionary
apparatus of citizenship in the nation-state, as articulated by Arendt, is further
problematized by the addition of gender—a factor which Arendt fails to acknowledge.
We can recognize in Egyptian feminist street art the efforts made by female artists and
protesters to answer Kraidy’s question in the affirmative: that women can be full-fledged
citizens, rather than only symbolic national figures, and demand to be included as such in
the new collectivities being formed through the revolutionary movement.
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Conclusion
As a trendsetter in the Arab region, Egypt serves as a rich case study for an
examination of street art in protest in the 2011 uprisings. By marrying analysis of specific
pieces of street art with the broader historical context, we can understand how Egyptian’s
use of street art as protest served three primary purposes: circumventing and subverting
state authority by laying claim to contested public spaces, democratizing the protest
process through widely accessible forms of activism and the creation of public discourse,
and giving voice to women-centered issues and experiences and raising broader questions
about the role of women as revolutionary citizens.
While these three themes have been discussed separately, it is important to
recognize that all took place simultaneously; in the public spaces where one of these
phenomena occurred, the others took place as well. Furthermore, the ability of street art
to circumvent and subvert the state, democratize protest, and communicate the gendered
nature of the revolutionary movement are interrelated concepts. Each component of street
art in protest discussed here built off of and depended upon the others. For instance, as
Egyptian women used street art to voice gendered revolutionary demands, their actions
facilitated the democratization of protest by bringing into the fold members of the nation
that had largely been excluded from positions of traditional political power.
While Egypt’s revolution was certainly marked by violence, both as a reason for
and reaction to protest, next we turn to Syria to examine the relationship between art and
violence and the role that humor and satire played in navigating this fraught landscape. In
2011, Syria’s revolutionary context appeared similar to Egypt’s, yet, in the months and
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years to follow, Syrians experienced a uniquely different revolutionary trajectory—one
that remains in flux today.
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Chapter II
Satire Under Surveillance:
Humor, Resistance, and Agency in Syria

“The art I do doesn’t stop a bullet, doesn’t bring a free democratic secular Syria, it
doesn’t bring back people who died… it gives us a reason to live.”
—Kinan Azmeh, Syrian Musician

“Your Turn Has Come, Doctor”
In March of 2011, a group of young adolescent boys spray painted anti-regime
graffiti on the walls of their schoolyard in the town of Daraa, Syria. Less than two days
later, security forces stormed their houses, arrested the boys, jailed them for over a
month, and subjected them to brutal torture. While detained, the boys’ families and
supporters gathered after the Friday prayers and took to the streets in protest of the boys’
treatment, calling for their release. One week later, as a larger crowd poured out of the
mosque denouncing the regime, security forces fired into the crowd and killed four men.
Additional protests sprung up in nearby villages and quickly emanated further from
Darra. By March 25th, the cities of Homs, Latakiyya, Idlib, and Deir al-Zur had all seen
protests of hundreds or thousands. The regime’s efforts to quell protests only fueled the
people’s rage. As non-violent protesters were repeatedly met with swift and immediate
force, the regime provided further evidence of the violent repression which protesters
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were mobilizing against. This began the Syrian revolution, with Daraa as its nucleus. And
the infamous words that catalyzed the uprisings? “Your Turn Has Come, Doctor.”

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/artwork-syrian-war_n_56eafa60e4b03a640a69e3df
Figure 9: Graffiti painted in March 2011 on a schoolyard wall in Daraa, Syria. The
text, which reads “Your Turn Has Come, Doctor,” refers to the President of Syria,
Bashar al-Assad, who is an ophthalmologist by training.
The text of this inflammatory piece referenced the ongoing uprisings across the
Middle East and North Africa and suggested a trajectory in which Syria would also
partake in this regional shift. To what extent was the Syrian uprising similar and distinct
from other protest movements and eventual revolutions in the region? When protests
erupted in late 2010 and early 2011, primarily in the trendsetter nations of Tunisia and
Egypt, “Syria initially appeared immune” to the trend.134 Because of the Syrian
government’s chronic imposition of restrictions on civic participation, onlookers doubted
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the Syrian public’s ability to adequately sustain protest and organize a coordinated
revolutionary effort. These theories were, of course, quickly proved wrong, as protest
spread beyond the town of Daraa and across the nation. Similar to other nations of the
Arab uprisings, Syrians “experienced the same frustrations and expressed the same
resentments due to widespread poverty, human rights violations, and the lack of
representation that came with inherited presidencies.”135
On the other hand, Syria offers a unique revolutionary context that cannot and
should not be collapsed to fit neatly into a broader regional storyline. Syria stands apart
from the other Arab uprisings as a particularly harrowing story of violence, police
brutalization, systematic oppression, and warfare. While protesters and bystanders across
the MENA certainly experienced danger and violence during the political, economic, and
social turmoil beginning in late 2010, the Syrian uprisings offered a distinct experience of
protest. Unlike other Arab nations, Syria’s uprising devolved into a nine-year civil war
which continues to date. The initially non-violent public protests in Syria were met with
immediate and swift force by the Assad regime. The regime’s violent crackdown only
strengthened protesters’ resolve, igniting a “cycle of repression and resistance.”136 The
relationship between the state and the public became particularly gruesome, devolving
into an ongoing civil war in which 300,000 people lost their lives and twelve million
were displaced in the first five years alone.137
Each nation involved in the Arab uprisings experienced similar revolutionary
themes but displayed unique characteristics and followed distinct trajectories. Just as the
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uprisings were not monolithic, neither was street art. The role of street art and protest was
not entirely uniform; rather, it was flexible and adaptable to differing and evolving
contexts. Street art is a tool of protest, and therefore, the public harness it in service of
their collective goals which may be nationally specific. Syrian street art demonstrates the
ways in which art is uniquely able to capture the aesthetics of brutality and communicate
the suffering inflicted by violent regimes, serving as a space to hold the public’s
collective pain. Amidst the literal destruction of the war-torn nation, art flourished—
juxtaposing destruction and creation and serving as testimony to the resilience of the
people. In their art forms, Syrians harnessed the power of humor and satire to wrench
power and control from the hands of the oppressors and empower the people.

A Note on Organization
The themes discussed in Chapter One—circumventing and subverting state
authority, the democratization of protest, and the gendered nature of revolutionary
movements—were and are present in Syria as well. For example, Yassin Al Haj Saleh
argues that the Syrian uprising “speaks to a diverse spectrum in Syrian society in terms of
orientation, culture, religion and sect,” and purports that “it is the closest thing to a Syrian
‘common.’”138 Thus, the Syrian uprising of 2011 and ensuing revolution certainly
democratized protest in a way that the country had never previously experienced. While
acknowledging the presence and influence of these factors in Syria, this chapter will
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move the analysis of street art in protest forward by examining the themes of art amidst
destruction, collective pain, and humorous modes of empowerment.
Nonetheless, the themes explored in this chapter are not exclusive to Syria. Many
other nations across the MENA—those that experienced uprisings and those that did
not—displayed similar themes through their street art. However, the Syrian uprising
offers a context that most aptly elucidates these themes.139 Specifically, the focus on
violence in Syria does not diminish the real, pervasive, and devastating effects of
violence in the protest movements of other Arab nations. As we move forward, it is
important to remember that the themes addressed in this chapter are not exclusively
Syrian but are best illuminated by the Syrian context.

The Syrian Security State
What was the context that made the Syrian uprisings distinct from other Arab
uprisings? In large part, the difference was a result of the nature of the state apparatus
which dictated not only a political structure, but also played a heavy hand in structuring
the entirety of Syrian society. While Syria is formally classified as a presidential republic,
the Ba‘ath party—controlled by the al-Assad family and select Alawite elites—retains
complete control. Furthermore, until the early stages of the uprising, president Bashar alAssad had broad and unchecked authority under a state of emergency decree which had
been in place since the Ba‘ath party came to power via a coup in 1963. Then, in 1970,
Hafez al-Assad executed another military coup that consolidated leadership among the
Alawite community. By appointing relatives and loyal members of the Alawite
139
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community to positions of leadership, the Assads created a pervasive intelligence
network in which “the army’s leadership and the multiple security organizations were
more tightly interwoven with the ruling circle in Syria than in Egypt or Tunisia.”140 When
Hafez al-Assad died in 2000, his son Bashar al-Assad succeeded him as president of
Syria.
We can understand the al-Assad family’s monopoly over Syria as a result of their
strategic political instrumentalisation. Samira Mobaied argues that during the five
decades that the Assad family has ruled Syria, they “’instrumentalised’ the Ba‘ath Party
and the army in order to perpetuate their power.”141 According to sociologist Marc
Uhalde, instrumentalisation refers to “the diversion of a process or object towards
purposes other than those initially conceived, an illegitimate diversion with regard to the
values or normative conceptions implicit in the process.”142 Political instrumentalisation
then, as defined by sociologist Yannick Barthe, is the “process of gaining access to the
political sphere for a particular cause, a technical subject or a social problem which
previously had not been treated politically.”143 Essentially, this means that processes,
organizations, institutions, etc. are used towards amassing and maintaining political
power, even if that purpose is an illegitimate use of the process, organization, institution,
etc. or is in conflict with its values or normative use.
In the context of Syria, Mobaied argues that political instrumentalisation is
manifested in the instrumentalisation of civil society, education, the constitution,
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secularism and religions, the opposition, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, media and
culture, and space and cities—all things whose intended purpose is not to strengthen and
maintain the Assad regime. Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, however, have insidiously
infiltrated these spaces and coopted them for the purpose of furthering the regime’s
agenda. For example, the Syrian Constitution’s purpose was to institute a republican form
of government consisting of popular elections and a multi-party system. The Assad
regime has, however, instrumentalised the Syrian Constitution to create a decidedly
unfree and corrupt political system. The People’s Assembly, the legislative body, is made
up of members that are “elected via lists drawn up by the Ba‘ath Party and the National
front, under the control of the intelligence services.”144 These elections, therefore, are not
free nor fair. In reality, the Ba‘ath Party is “the only political party standing for election,
and the only one governing the country since 1963.”145 In February of 2012, the country
adopted a new constitution in which there is no reference to a political party. However,
this new constitution is largely considered a sham, as it grants the President power over
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.146
Any opposition to the Ba‘ath Party has also been instrumentalised by the regime.
Mobaied traces this phenomenon to 1980 when the Ba‘ath Party violently repressed the
Muslim Brotherhood—a moment that signaled “the beginning of the annihilation of civil
society and all independent political life.” Since then, both Hafez and Bashar al-Assad
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have deliberately constructed enemies out of any and all political opponents. Through
this strategy, the regime was able to create a narrative about the 2011 uprisings that
discredited and invalidated the revolutionary movement. Mobaied’s argument that the
regime instrumentalised the opposition is corroborated by Jadaliyya Reports’
observations that the regime seeks to justify excessive force “on the pretext that the
government is under attack by armed gangs.”147 By casting the protesters as illicit thugs
rather than valid political players, the regime was able to villainize the opposition, and
thus deny legitimacy to the popular uprisings and further oppress the Syrian people.
Of particular relevance to street art is the regime’s instrumentalisation of space
and cities. Mobaied echoes David Harvey’s assertion that space and power are related. As
we recall from the introduction of this thesis, Harvey argued that through the domination
of space, which is a source of power, a state can continually reproduce its own authority.
Given this relationship, Mobaied purports that the Assad regime structured public spaces
in a manner that encouraged spatial fragmentation. This fragmentation facilitated the
regime’s ability to impose a system of surveillance, which served as “a modality of the
territorialisation of dominant groups and political institutions.”148 Just as the Assad
family and the Ba‘athist party held exclusive control over political life, they too held
near-exclusive control over the apportionment of public space. By fragmenting public
space, the regime made it difficult for Syrians to physically organize and mobilize, while
concurrently making it easy for government security forces to track and regulate the
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activities of citizens. From Mobaied’s explanation of the regime’s instrumentalisation of
space, we can see how the regime manipulated space as a tool for surveillance and the
creation of a security state.
These various forms of political instrumentalisation reveal how the concept “is a
fundamental method of the Syrian political system,” in which “it is used systematically
and methodically to incorporate and subjugate the whole of Syrian society.”149 Upon the
uprising, the regime attempted to shut down any challenges to the existing structure of
political instrumentalisation through the use of violence. Despite the fact that the initial
protests were largely nonviolent, the regime responded with disproportionate force.
Assad deployed heavily armed security forces in an attempt to squash ongoing protests
and prevent Syrians from organizing or executing other demonstrations. Examples of
these violent crackdowns include “using snipers to shoot into crowds of peaceful
protesters,” “deploying army tanks to shell residential areas,” and targeting “funerals of
people killed in earlier protests.”150 According to Amnesty International, over 1,800
people were killed in the first six months of the 2011 uprising. Security forces also made
use of widespread arrest and detainment practices. Many of those arrested were “held
incommunicado at unknown locations at which torture and other ill-treatment are
reported to be rife.”151 As a result, the number of deaths in custody has risen sharply since
the Syrian conflict began and, in many of these cases, “there is evidence that torture
caused or contributed to the deaths.”152 Amnesty International reports that “some of the
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dead, who include children, were also mutilated either before or after death in particularly
grotesque ways” before their bodies were returned to the victims’ families.153 In short,
Assad rules through terror—targeting protesters, bystanders, and innocent civilians alike.
The following image illustrates many Syrians’ experiences under the Assad
regime:

https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/news/thehopes-of-syrias-protests-shine-through-in-new-hackney-artexhibition-8686252.html
Figure 10: A body behind bars depicted on a poster as part of the
Syrian artists’ poster collective ‘Alshaab alsori aref tarekh’ (‘The
Syrian People Know Their Way’).
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The poster depicts a body imprisoned behind bars in a tiny cell. The prisoner is
hunched over, with the face buried in his or her hands. The feeble position in which the
prisoner is made small communicates a sense of defeat. The nakedness, as well, invokes a
sense of helplessness in the face of the regime and the security forces’ brutal tactics.
Furthermore, the close walls seem to squeeze the prisoner in, conveying a sense of
suffocation. As the physical walls of the prison tighten around the body, the prison cell
serves as a metaphor for the way in which the regime tightens its control over Syrian
society. Assad and his security forces confront the people at every angle, continually and
increasingly repressing Syrians. The facelessness of the prisoner reflects the anonymity
of the individual, and thus, elicits the sense that it could be any ordinary Syrian. The fact
that security forces conducted mass arrests and extrajudicial killings with no regard for
due process only strengthens the viewer’s sense that the body depicted represents the
‘everyman.’
The text reads “They struggled for our sake. Let’s struggle for their freedom.”
The line functions on two levels. First, it serves as a call to action for Syrians to continue
demanding for the release of political prisoners. Second, it also functions as a call for
continued and sustained revolutionary activity. As the person depicted here is imprisoned
for dissenting against the regime political hegemony, the piece calls on Syrians to work
towards a system wherein individuals have freedoms of expression and assembly and the
right to political participation. Even though the poster is devoid of ornamentation or
graphic detail, it conveys an emotional weight. The simple design elevates the message of
the poster: Syrians can continue resisting Assad’s security state by harnessing the power
of comradery and community.
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The Cult of the Leader
In addition to rampant abuse by security forces, the Syrian regime created a
surveillance state by infusing daily life with propaganda praising the Assad family. In the
presidencies of both Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad, the regime projected the
president, his image, and his persona as an idealized and heroic leader of the nation. The
Assads cultivated a cult of the leader wherein the leader himself was equated to the
regime, the government, the state, and the entire Syrian nation. In both public and private
Syrian schools, for example, students were required to repeat the Ba‘ath Party’s slogans,
were confronted with the Party’s logo in textbooks, and were surrounded by photographs
of Hafez and Bashar al-Assad. The infiltration of the education system and the
manipulation of curriculum attempted to “unify society under the control of the Ba‘athist
and Assad system.”154 The Assads tried to inculcate even the youngest members of the
nation into the cult of the leader by saturating their early lives with propaganda.
Belal A. M. Salaymeh conceptualizes the Assad regime as a form of
patrimonialism.155 According to sociologist Max Weber, patrimonialism is a system
wherein “an administration and a military force…are purely personal instruments of the
master.”156 The military, the Ba‘ath Party, security forces, the justice system, and
economic policies became Assad’s personal tools of power. As the state apparatus
became entirely dominated by Assad, there became a consequent association between the
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state and Assad. In other words, the state begins to be equated with Assad himself.
According to Salaymeh, this “personalization of the regime” functioned “in such a way
that the patrimonial role of Assad started to be unquestionable.”157 Assad was no longer a
symbol of the state, he was the state.
In a literal sense, Bashar al-Assad staged himself as the embodiment of the Syrian
nation-state. The regime plastered images of Assad throughout public spaces. His
likeness was pervasive, all-encompassing, and omnipresent. Assad’s face and watchful
eyes permeated cities and towns across the country, reinforcing the system of
surveillance that controlled Syrian life. As Amal Hanano wrote in October of 2011, “In
the end, after the terror, torture and murder, the tyrant rules with his face. The people
cannot escape it, his image is all-consuming, devouring our streets, our walls, our shops,
our screens.”158 Again, we are reminded of the relationship between control of public
space and power, as purported by Jürgen Habermas and David Harvey. From Harvey’s
essential question— “In whose image and to whose benefit is space to be shaped?”—to
Edward Soja’s theory of the spatiality of injustice, we can see how the physical presence
of Bashar al-Assad’s likeness throughout public spaces serves to reproduce and maintain
the regime’s structures of power. As Bashar al-Assad constructed his image as equivalent
to the regime, the state, and Syria, he sought personal power over all three.
However, the cult of the leader did not go unchallenged. The following image
shows one way Syrians resisted Assad’s personalization of the regime:
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https://www.dw.com/en/assads-all-or-nothing-fight/a-16148323
Figure 11: A defaced and bloodied poster of Bashar al-Assad which was spraypainted over with the words “We are coming, duck face.”
In a city street, a larger-than-life poster of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad stands
defaced. We can imagine that protesters removed the poster from its designated location
and placed it in the middle of the street amid heaps of garbage and abandoned furniture.
Even that action in itself is highly subversive; “in a harshly authoritarian environment
like Syria’s, each publicly and collectively expressed view or frame of noncompliance
becomes an act of protest.”159 Thus, this relocating of the poster reflects a shift from
Assad as a prestigious national figure to a dirtied remnant of an urban street.
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Furthermore, the words spray-painted across Assad’s photograph— “We are coming”—
reveal the protesters’ intention to continue challenging the presidents’ governing
authority, his surveillance tactics, and the cult of the leader. The phrase suggest that this
symbolic act is just the beginning of their efforts to resist Assad. Furthermore, the
protesters have painted devil ears atop Assad’s head and covered his mouth with dripping
red paint resembling blood. By adding these details, protesters portray Assad as a flesheating monster capable of brutal violence and literally show that Bashar al-Assad’s image
is tainted with the blood of the Syrian people.
In addition to defacing official images of the President, protesters generated new,
alternative images of the leader:

https://suzeeinthecity.wordpress.com/2011/08/11/protest-graffiti-solidarity-with-syriaspreads-from-cairo/
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Figure 12: A stenciled piece of graffiti of Bashar al-Assad with the slogan “The People
Want the Downfall of the Regime.” Sighted in July, 2011. The graffiti has since been
painted over.
This image shows a simple black and white stencil of the figure of Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad. Typically, the Syrian people are confronted with official images of the
leader created, distributed, and posted by the regime. In this case, however, the Syrian
people created their own images of the leader, inverting the traditional flow of power
imposed by the state down upon the populace. By creating their own images, the people
challenged the state’s power to dictate what forms of the President would be displayed,
essentially unsettling the regime’s attempt to create a cult of the leader. Furthermore, this
piece of graffiti is accompanied by the text “The People Want the Downfall of the
Regime.” This phrase originated in Egypt during the protests in Tahrir Square and
quickly spread throughout the region, becoming the universal slogan for the Arab
uprisings of 2011. By pairing Assad’s image with this slogan, protesters infuse Assad’s
likeness with revolutionary meaning. The presence of Assad’s figure in public places no
longer symbolizes his reified status and ultimate power but rather marks localities of
resistance.

Covert Mobilization
To outside observers, it may have seemed that the Syrian uprising appeared
suddenly and without warning. In reality, however, the Syrian uprising of 2011 stems
from a long undercurrent of dissatisfaction and oppression, dating back to the leadership
of Hafez al-Assad. While the graffiti in Daraa provided the immediate impetus for
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Syrians en masse to act, the protests had been long brewing beneath the surface. For
decades, the Syrian regime’s totalitarian grip over civic and political life prevented the
public expression of a robust opposition. Nonetheless, Syrian citizens were discussing
politics, organizing the public, and mobilizing an opposition in covert and private ways.
Reinoud Leenders argues that “the Syrian case can give us important clues to how acts
and modes of effective revolutionary protest and claim-making develop without strong
and consequential prior repertoires of contention.”160 Thus, the protest movement in Syria
did not look the same as it did other Arab countries because Syria lacked the public,
visible “repertories of contention” that we saw in places like Egypt.
In the face of a regime that was deliberately designed to prevent collective
dissent, how did Syrians quickly and explosively capitalize on the momentum of Daraa?
Leenders argues that Syrians relied on the “‘hidden transcript’ of the subordinated.”161
This “hidden transcript” refers to the experiences, grievances, desires, and demands that
had existed collectively among Syrians for years. The hidden transcript formed the
framework for the revolutionary movement when these covert, private ideas exploded
publicly in the spring of 2011. Upon the protests in Daraa, many Syrians “expressed
profound delight in instantly recognizing their own long-standing grievances in what was
now displayed and shared publicly for the very first time.”162 As a result, the airing of the
hidden transcript fostered “an extraordinary level of group solidarity, camaraderie, and
sense of collective purpose.”163
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The evolution of the Syrian uprising reminds us of the extent to which the Arab
uprisings were nationally specific. In Egypt, we saw the development of a healthy protest
culture through the mobilization of the working class. In the Syrian context, however, the
regime’s near-exclusive hold over public space and civic and political life forced Syrians
to organize their opposition in less visible ways. This covert mobilization, which Syrians
had been practicing for decades, laid the groundwork for the explosive public uprising
which began in Daraa in the spring of 2011.

Art Under Surveillance
Bashar al-Assad’s surveillance state dictated strict requirements for artistic
content and produced serious repercussions for artists who dared to express
dissatisfaction or criticism of the regime in their work. According to official policies, the
regime censors artistic production through the preapproval of exhibitions and events in
order to maintain a “firm grip on virtually every aspect of local visual culture.”164 The
regime enforced censorship through violent force as well. In June of 2015, the Syrian
Network for Human Rights documented the extrajudicial killing of 22 artists (14 of
whom were killed by government forces, including four who were tortured to death) and
the arrest and kidnapping of 57 artists (50 of whom were kidnapped by government
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forces, including nine who were still under arrest or forcibly disappeared at the time of
the report’s publication).165
The regime’s violent crackdown against artists terrorized the artistic community
and successfully silenced some artists. According to Maymanah Farhat, the regime’s
intimidation tactics, such as the murder, torture, and imprisoning of artists and the
ransacking of their studios, “have created a pervasive climate of fear.”166 As a result,
many prominent artists, curators, and gallery owners fled the country and sought refuge
in neighboring states during the uprising. In April of 2012, Maymanah Farhat wrote that
“much of the Damascus art scene has been brought to a standstill.”167 However, some
artists saw art as an apt form of protest and were further motivated by the regime’s
violent backlash against subversive art. It was, after all, an artistic act of defiance that
sparked the protests in Daraa and paved the way for the nation’s uprising. This spirit of
subversive artistic agency “inspired countless Syrian artists to take further steps toward
breaking through the ominous system of policing that has long hindered creative
production.”168 As galleries closed and professionally trained artists fled, others turned to
nontraditional creative pursuits. Thus, even as the formal art scene in Syria collapsed, the
uprising unlocked “a powerful counter-culture” and “imbued daily life with an
unprecedented outburst of creative expression” in which street art emerged as a vibrant
revolutionary practice.169
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Satirizing the Leader
Syrian creatives used humor as a primary tool in protest art in order to wrench
power from the hands of the oppressor. In Street Art of Resistance, Mohamed M. Helmy
and Sabine Frerichs argue that humor in the Arab uprisings “flipped the balance of power
on the street, and helped sustain the spirit of resistance.”170 In the case of Syria, humor
was successful because it evaded the fear that the regime intentionally created. In fact,
Helmy and Frerichs note that authoritarian environments produced the most active stream
of humorous art. Through the use of humor and satire, the artists assume the roles of
“both analysts and activists.”171 As analysts, artists succinctly portray their
circumstances, condensing reality and “reducing it to absurdity.”172 As activists, artists
use satire to question the origins of authority. Through satire, Syrians desecrated symbols
of power—particularly the image of Bashar al-Assad. By visually portraying the
president in a disrespectful manner, Syrians mocked his authority. In other words, humor
resisted the bounds of Assad’s strategies of terror.
A common form of satire for Syrians was the use of caricature. According to
Awad and Wagoner, the Arabic word for caricature “etymologically connects the
symbolical activity of ‘joking’ or ‘criticizing’ with the much more physical activity of
hammering or upsetting.”173 Thus, the process of caricaturizing is similar to “‘poking’
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sensitive zones with many insolent and intrusive fingers.”174 In caricaturizing the
President, Syrian artists took aim at characteristics of Assad, his regime, or his state that
were “sensitive zones” in order to maximize the effect of the artwork. For example,
Syrian artists often portrayed Assad as a duck after an email exchange between Assad
and his wife was leaked, in which she referred to him as “duck” as an affectionate
nickname:

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-03-30/assads-nickname-duck-goesviral/3923064
Figure 13: A poster displaying Bashar al-Assad as Donald Duck at a gathering in
Hasaka, Syria.
This poster depicts Assad as Donald Duck, the cartoon character created by Walt Disney
Productions and made popular by children’s television programs. Donald Duck is an
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intentionally goofy character who talks with a marked lisp and waddles comically. The
artist creates three layers of satirical analysis here: first, Assad’s depiction as an animal
dehumanizes him; second, Assad is analogized to a duck—a small, relatively weak
animal which strips him of his power; third, Assad is portrayed as Donald Duck, a
laughable sidekick who is often exceptionally unlucky and hot-tempered. All three levels
of satire serve to defile the heroic image Assad has created for himself and expose Assad
as the people truly see him. Furthermore, Assad’s assertive posture, communicated via
the position of his arms on his hips, is entirely betrayed by the dejected look on his face.
The sad frown and gentle slope of Assad’s eyes communicates a glum emotion that
appears pathetic. Assad seems to resemble a despondent teacher or parent who has been
disrespected by his pupils. Through this portrayal, the artist invokes a faux-paternalism
that reinforces Syrians’ understanding of what Assad is not—a respected father of the
nation.
Likewise, the following mural makes use of the nickname:

97

https://www.flickr.com/photos/syriafreedom/8106434892
Figure 14: A mural depicting Bashar al-Assad and others as ducks being fed by a
human.
In this mural, Assad, along with other members of the Assad family and surveillance state
officials, is shown with the body of a duck. A human stands next to Assad and feeds him
seeds or grains. The artists’ choice to show Assad being fed paints Assad as dependent
and helpless. Furthermore, the distinction between Assad’s duck body and human head
symbolizes Assad’s position as a symbolic figure of the regime, rather than a true leader
of the nation. In this artistic depiction, Assad appears more threatening than he actually
his—perhaps reflecting the Syrian people’s growing willingness to confront Assad’s rule
head-on.
Syrian artists’ depiction of Assad as a duck is especially ironic because the family
name “al-Assad” means “the lion”—a nickname that the al-Assad family has often
exploited in the media. Thus, artists also mock Bashar al-Assad’s official epithet which
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projects strength and ferocity by replacing it with a humorous new nickname with a silly
association. The transition from lion to duck represents Assad’s fall from grace in the
eyes of the people. Whereas sullying official portraits of Assad was a form of resistance
to the regime’s attempt to create a cult of the leader, satirizing Assad worked as a covert
tactic under the surveillance state to generate group consensus.

Fragmented Public Spaces in a Violent Reality
How did Syria, a country ravaged by years of regime brutality, indiscriminate
violence, and persistent warfare, become a hotbed of revolutionary imagery? This
warfare destroyed many key public spaces and created a fractured urban landscape. As
the uprising emanated from Daraa and swept across the country in the spring of 2011,
protests moved increasingly closer to the capital of Damascus but were unable to occupy
the city’s major squares. In April, peaceful protesters at Abbasiyeen Square just east of
Damascus were met with heavy gunfire by the regime. Likewise, demonstrations in the
central squares of Homs and Hama were dispersed by the regime’s swift and violent
backlash. In the case of the Egyptian revolution, protesters asserted agency through the
cooptation of key public spaces; as Egyptians occupied Tahrir Square for weeks, they
confronted the heart of state apparatus and staked their claim to the city. In Syria,
however, protesters were unable to reach central Damascus—home to the political and
security establishment. Syrians were prevented from protesting in centralized, urban
public spaces in the same manner as Egyptians.
Protesters’ inability to occupy key public spaces—both as a result of physical
destruction and surveillance by the regime’s security forces—pushed Syrians to seek

99

alternative spaces for protest. Of this phenomenon Hassan Abbas wrote, “Because this
public space was destroyed early on, it was transmuted from the physical to the cultural
and spiritual sphere and dispersed all over Syria like droplets of water.” Syrians used
hand-held posters in demonstrations and marches, produced original video content and
distributed it via the internet, and made ample use of remaining spaces for street art—
forming new collective spaces for the revolutionary movement to flourish. For example,
scholar Stephennie Mulder argues that poster art and photographs of the posters online
“becomes a kind of permanent global wall for ‘street’ art.”175 Likewise, Donatella Della
Ratta bolsters Mulder’s claim by highlighting the central role of modern technology in
the production of revolutionary imagery. Syrians used the internet and social media as
accessible tools that allowed for a mass of creators and viewers alike. Here, the context in
which the content is produced becomes equally if not more important than the content
itself—reminding us of Henri Lefebvre’s assertion in The Production of Space that the
process of production and the product itself are two inseparable aspects of space. Syrian
art of this kind not only symbolizes creativity, but also “a new relationship with power
and authority.”176 Thus, the context in which this art is produced reinforces the
significance of the very act of producing such art. In fact, these alternative tactics acted as
another element of resistance; as they worked to “help undo the social fragmentation and
re-connect people,” these tactics thus defied the very fragmentation that the regime had
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strategically engineered to maintain the cult of the leader, the public’s obedience, and
absolute power.177
Thus, the Syrian context reveals that robust, intact public spaces are not, in fact,
necessary for the successful production of creative protest such as street art. Syrian
protest art shows us that street art, as a form of public discourse and revolutionary
messaging, transcends the street. In exposing the hidden transcript, “the distance between
artists and audiences, between producers and consumers, between one citizen and
another, fades away,” revealing how art can facilitate connection even in fragmented
public spaces and under a surveillance state.178 Take the following image, for example:

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syrians-are-leaving-graffiti-all-over-aleppomessages-assad
Figure 15: A wall of a bombed building in Aleppo reads “We’ll Come Back, My
Love.”
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This piece of graffiti was spray-painted on the crumbling wall of a bombed-out building
in Aleppo, Syria. The city of Aleppo, a key battleground area in the Syrian civil war, was
caught in a four-year deadlock that caused massive destruction to the infrastructure and
forced millions to flee their homes. The physical location of the graffiti on the crumbling
wall infuses even lost spaces with a revolutionary message and serves to sustain the spirit
of resistance. The message of the graffiti exists in direct conversation with the
devastation of the war; it is an example of the creation that stems from destruction. The
choice of the word “back,” illustrates the artist’s strong feelings of home and his or her
pride for the city. Furthermore, the plural pronoun “we” asserts a collective ownership of
the space. As the graffiti addresses the viewer as “my love,” it communicates a message
of humanity, community, and comradery between an anonymous artist and each
individual onlooker.
Likewise, the following mural embellishes the remains of fractured a public space
with a message of collective revolutionary hope:
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https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-37523340
Figure 16: In this mural, painted by rebel fighter and artist Abu Malik al-Shami, a young
girl offers flowers to a grave. The text reads: “Our roses are for those who watered them
with their blood.” Located in Darayya.
This mural depicts a young child standing in front of a grave with outstretched arms,
offering a single flower. In terms of physical location, the crumbling wall echoes the
collective hardships experienced by the Syrian people, while the vibrant painting asserts a
sense of collective resistance—surviving in even the most destructive of places. More
specifically, the grave is simple and unornamented, communicating that it could be the
grave of any ordinary, unknown Syrian. In this mural, the grave functions as a symbol of
the deaths of thousands of Syrian combatants and civilians alike who have lost their lives
to the ongoing conflict. A child, shoeless and disheveled, stands facing this grave. The
child is small in stature, while the grave is large and imposing. The physical layout of the
mural, wherein the grave is on an equal plane as the child, portrays it as force equal to, if
not exceeding, life. The mural illustrates the constant battle between life and death that
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Syrians must fight each day. However, the text interjects a sense of hope and forward
progress. The phrase reads, “Our roses are for those who watered them with their blood.”
Here, the artist suggests that something positive, beautiful even, can come from such
suffering. Death is not wasted, for it serves as a means to life for the next generation.
Thus, despite its grim and solemn appearance, the mural offers a message of hope for the
future of the Syrian people.

Self-Satire
In addition to satirizing the leader and his regime, Syrian artists engaged in a
unique form of self-satire. According to Stephennie Mulder, self-satire is defined as “a
form of visual critique directed simultaneously at the regime and the self.”179 Mulder
distinguishes between humor that “punches up” to mock the leader, the regime, or those
in power and humor that “punches down” to reveal the position of ordinary people.180
While self-satire “punches down” to addresses the role of the people, it carefully
distinguishes between agency and circumstances. In other words, it does not blame
Syrians for their role in conflict, but rather illuminates how Syrians are victims of
circumstances beyond their control. Mulder explains that self-satire shows “ordinary
people inexorably entangled, against their will, in the realm of the terrifying and the
ridiculous” and that these circumstances were “created by the regime.”181
Furthermore, Mulder concludes that self-satire was a uniquely Syrian
phenomenon. While creative protest exploded in nearly every part of the Middle East and
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North Africa during the political and social upheavals of the spring of 2011 and beyond,
most of these regions generated traditional political satire directed at government
regimes, state policies, and national leaders. In other words, they only punched up. Selfsatire, on the other hand, was “a notable characteristic” of the Syrian context.182 Mulder
argues that this phenomenon of self-satire stems from Syria’s “long tradition of black
humor” that artists cultivated during decades of consistent repression enforced by the
Assad family’s uninterrupted rule since the 1970s.183
As the 2011 uprising escalated to become the Syrian civil war, artists drew upon
this practice of dark humor to reflect the complicated nature of the conflict. Through
satire, they highlighted the reality that the Syrian people were, in select ways, complicit
in the perpetuation of violence. Take the following image, for example:

https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-37523340
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Figure 17: In a school destroyed by bombing, a cartoon of a student writes “We
used to joke and say, ‘God please destroy the school’… and he did.” Created by
Abu Malik al-Shami.
In this image, we see a mural on the chalkboard of a bombed-out classroom. The mural
depicts a student writing on the chalkboard: “We used to joke and say, ‘God please
destroy the school’… and he did.” Through this phrase, the artist critiques the Syrian
education system wherein the school is simply a space for the propaganda of the regime.
The student here wishes for the destruction of the school in order to avoid his or her
inculcation into a state defined by the power of its leader. The destruction of the school,
which is evident by the crumbling walls and disarray of furniture, exists in direct
conversation with the artwork. As the painted phrase draws attention to the destruction
surrounding the subject and viewer alike, it demonstrates the entrenched presence of
violence as a part of Syrians’ new reality. The artist’s choice to show the effects of
violence on children—who are among the most vulnerable populations and traditionally
represent innocence—evokes an emotional response in the viewer. As children were
unwittingly caught in the crossfire of the Syrian civil war, the phrase begs the question:
did Syrians initiate something more than they bargained for? Through this mural the artist
speaks to his or her fellow countrymen, asking: did we create this devastation? This
bloodshed? This horror? The artist engages in the practice of self-satire by reflecting on
the role of ordinary Syrians and grappling with their complicity.
While the mural above illustrates the ways in which the Syrian revolution has
upended children’s lives, the mural below suggests a redemptive quality of children:
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https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-37523340
Figure 18: In this mural, painted by Abu Malik al-Shami, a young child instructs a
soldier to act with love. Located in Darayya.
In this mural, the artist conjures up the image of a classroom through reference to an
easel, a chalkboard, and a pointer stick. Ironically, a young child is instructing an adult:
the child occupies the position of power as she stands and lectures the soldier who
remains sitting dutifully. Despite the reality in which both live, the child instructs the
soldier to use love as the antidote to violence. The mural’s physical location is relevant as
well. Because the mural stands amidst the rubble and crumbling walls of a Syrian city,
the mural’s presence juxtaposes creation and destruction. As the mural preaches a
message of nonviolence amid the ruinous consequences of a violent conflict, it
commands the attention of the viewer by capitalizing on the visual incongruity of loving
versus fighting. Furthermore, the solider is simply a vague outline; in fact, his weapon is
the most detailed part of the figure. Thus, the focus is on the weapon and the capacity for
violence that the weapon represents. Through these artistic choices, the artist uses the
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soldier as a stand-in for all armed participants. The mural does not implicate one specific
armed force, such as the regime’s military or the Free Syrian Army, but rather, criticizes
all militaristic actors in the conflict. Rather than communicate a pro-regime or proopposition message, the artist takes aim at a larger issue at play: the use of brutal force by
all combatants. Thus, this mural is a form of self-satire because it highlights the
complicity of even the revolutionary forces in enacting violence upon Syrian
communities and perpetuating warfare.

Empowering the Disempowered
What effect did grim and dark artwork have on a populace? Did the reproduction
of horrific scenes of violence work to reinforce a sense of victimization, cynicism, and
defeat? This may appear true on the surface, but in actuality, dark humor and satire
functioned as a form of collective empowerment for the Syrian people. First, the act of
creation in itself is a powerful affront to the state’s totalitarian system of control over the
creation and dissemination of media and its intentional fragmentation of public space. In
the traditional state and citizen dynamic, citizens are “on the receiving end of political
communication messages.”184 But by creating their own political messages, Syrian artists
inverted this dynamic and unsettled the hierarchy wherein the state apparatus dominates
the populace. Artists and activists generated imagery that reflected their “pro-active
citizenship” despite the political and structural circumstances in which such activity was
severely restrained.185 Furthermore, artists created imagery that explicitly challenged the
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state and its authority by “manipulate[ing] regime-backed messages and re-inject[ing]
them into public space.”186 This art allowed the Syrian people to assert themselves as a
collectivity separate from and positioned against the state. According to scholar Lina
Khatib, the result is that “political communication theory has now moved beyond…oneway communication to include non-linear exchanges.”187
In addition to sending revolutionary messages to the state, Syrians also used art to
communicate with and among the public. Because of its shocking and darkly ironic
nature, Syrian street art produced an arresting emotional and psychological response in
the viewer. Mulder argues that the artwork became “an intermediate space for the deeper
communication of ideas and emotions” between the creator and viewer.188 Likewise,
Khatib concurs that the visual imagery of the Arab uprisings “was simultaneously
watched and emulated,” amounting to a form of social interaction.189 In fact, the process
of witnessing this art (as well as re-creating and disseminating it) elicited “intracommunal and public empathy with the suffering of the Syrian people.” 190 This empathy
facilitated identification between creator and viewer, thus building unity around the idea
of a Syrian public, and in turn, serving as a means of collective agency and
empowerment. By displaying the despair and horror of the Syrian situation, the artists did
not perpetuate victimization; rather, they insisted that “their circumstances must be
revealed, witnessed and radically identified with.”191 The Syrian uprising and ensuing
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civil war was a political struggle in which the Syrian people proclaimed their collective
voice through visual means. Syrians, who for decades had been shut out of civil society,
harnessed the power of imagery to create agency.

Conclusion
Today, Syria remains embroiled in conflict. The uprising of 2011 evolved into a
civil war between the Ba‘athist Syrian Arab Republic, led by Bashar al-Assad, and the
opposition. Initially, the Free Syrian Army emerged as a leading force for the opposition,
but rebel groups quickly splintered into various armed militias. The complexity of the
situation has allowed for the rise of terrorist acts and extremist organizations, further
compounded by the involvement of several foreign allies—none of whom have tangibly
contributed to establishing peace in Syria. The nine-year long civil war has claimed over
400,000 lives and displaced roughly 11.8 million people. In the midst of disaster, how do
we evaluate the role of art? This context makes this chapter’s effort to understand the
origins and effects of Syrian street art ever more urgent.
By rooting our examination of Syrian street art in the country’s political and
historical context, we come to understand the magnitude of art’s role in challenging the
Assad regime. Through the production and proliferation of street art, Syrians defied the
very validity of the state’s structure and function; artists confronted security measures,
resisted the cult of the leader, disempowered the dictator, mobilized under surveillance,
created beauty amid destruction, formed collective identity in a fractured landscape, and
asserted agency—all through visual means. The unique political context and
revolutionary trajectory of Syria demonstrates that protest art throughout the Middle East
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and North Africa was not monolithic, but rather, nationally-specific. The duality of both
nationally-specific contexts and regional trends within the visual production of the Arab
uprisings will be further explored in the next chapter. Through an examination of street
art in Lebanon, we will recognize the value of adopting a transnational lens through
which to view the political, social, and cultural ruptures that occurred in 2011.

Chapter III
Transcending Borders:
Anti-Sectarianism and Transnationalism in Lebanon

“I’m embellishing my city… It is about art. It’s not about gunshots.”
–Omar Kabbani, Lebanese street artist
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“Tomorrow is a Better Day”
After fifteen years living on Beirut’s Bliss Street, Ali Abdallah had become a
fixture of the neighborhood. Nonetheless, he was literally left out in the cold by his
community and tragically passed on the coldest night of the year in 2013. Shortly after
his death, street artist Yazan Halwani created this mural:

http://www.lebanontraveler.com/en/magazine/yazan_halwani_colors_beirut/
Figure 19: “Ali Abdallah” by Yazan Halwani in Beirut, Lebanon.
Halwani pays tribute to Abdallah by communicating his importance to the neighborhood
through the mural’s large scale, hyper-realistic portrait, aesthetic design, and bold use of
text and color. The mural makes visible the presence of unsheltered people, serving as a
constant reminder that the city must care for all members of the urban community.
Halwani sends a message of community responsibility, calling for empathy and humanity
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across stigmatized socioeconomic divides. In addition to the face of Abdallah, Halwani
painted the phrase “tomorrow is a better day” to display a message of hope for the future,
inspire Beirut residents to improve their community, and wish a peaceful afterlife upon
Abdallah. Furthermore, without next of kin, Halwani’s mural serves as an attempt to give
Abdallah a makeshift burial. Located on the wall of the street where he lived and died,
the mural memorializes Abdallah as an integral part of the urban landscape and reaffirms
his right to the city. The city is Abdallah’s final resting place.
Yazan Halwani’s mural of Ali Abdallah exemplifies the predominant style and
function of Lebanese street art. In subsequent examples, we will continue to encounter
the deployment of Arabic calligraphy, bright colors, and exceptional detail similar to
Halwani’s style seen in this mural. Likewise, other Lebanese street artists echo Halwani’s
goals to encourage collective ownership of the city and responsibility for its residents,
build consensus across sectarian divides, and beautify the city to move forward from a
violent and destructive past. In Lebanon, street art is typically received positively. It is
tolerated by authorities and often welcomed by the community. Police usually turn a
blind eye to the practice and rarely reprimand artists. Thus, unlike the Syrian context,
artists are much more likely to sign their name to their work. In general, street art is
perceived as a practice of beautifying the city, rather than as an act of vandalism.
In her dissertation “Writing on the Walls: Conversations with Beirut’s Street
Artists,” Zeina Najjar interviews five leading figures in the Lebanese street art scene to
investigate the driving motivations of their work. She finds that artists create in response
to the socio-political situation of Lebanon. More specifically, they seek to improve the
city through the beautification of public spaces, to “cultivate a sense of ownership” and
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community identity, and to counter sectarian discourse by using art as a form of “honest
expression.”192 Katelyn M. Bronell’s analysis of the work of young Lebanese street artists
corroborates Najjar’s findings. Bronell argues that Lebanese youth use street art as a
means of publishing narratives of reconciliation. Reconciliation can be understood as the
implementation of productive communication about sensitive topics across difference.
The art reveals three primary elements of reconciliation: first, “acceptance and
acknowledgement of a collective past”; “reparation of destroyed relationships through
similar cultural symbols”; and “commitment to a future of coexistence and peace.”193
While their particular language differs, both Najjar’s and Bronell’s findings offer
insight into the nature of Lebanese street art as a positive and constructive mechanism for
community development. In this chapter, I argue that Lebanese street art reveals art’s
capability to communicate and build consensus across borders. Art transcends spatial
boundaries, shaping new public spaces in which communication across divisions can take
place. This phenomenon takes place on both small and large scales—defying urban
borders, national borders, and regional borders to build transnational solidarity.

Political History is Artistic History
The nature of public art in Lebanon has been undeniably shaped by the country’s
political history. Much of the messaging espoused in street art is in response to historical
events, experiences, and legacies. Therefore, in order to analyze Lebanese street art, we
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must first establish an understanding of key moments in the nation’s history. This brief
review of historical transitions history will contextualize the street art produced in the last
twenty years, allowing us to better understand the artists’ choices and the larger
significance of their work.
The Lebanese state—born out of the post-WWI British and French mandate
system and steeped in a colonial legacy—is structured on the basis of perceived sectarian
differences. 194 Since achieving independence from French colonial rule and establishing
a multiconfessional state through the National Pact of 1943, the nation-building project
remained a turbulent on-going process, lending itself to fraught sectarian tensions and
alternating periods of peace and violence. In 1975, such sectarian tensions sparked a
fifteen-year-long civil war. It began as a conflict primarily between the Phalange party
(primarily Maronite Christian) and the Lebanese National Movement, but quickly
became increasingly complex with the involvement of other groups, such as the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (mixed membership but with key Muslim leaders),
and the intervention of foreign governments and their armies—Syria and Israel, most
notably. On December 6th of 1975, infamously called Black Saturday, roadblocks were
set up throughout Beirut where identification cards were inspected for religious
affiliation. Measures such as these transformed Beirut into a divided city—a Christian
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East and a Muslim West partitioned by the neutral Green Line. This divide now served as
a structural embodiment of the confessional differences deployed as a method of rule first
in the colonial mandate system and then in the emergent nation.
The divided city also entailed the emergence of militia groups, most notably
Hizbullah, which continued to play commanding political roles long after the civil war
ended. As militias took control over what they considered to be ‘their territory,’ Beirut—
at one point a locale for political, economic, and administrative centralization—became a
city of roughly ten districts “carved out and cloistered by violence.”195 The borders
between these districts were marked by armed checkpoints signaling the exit from one
militia’s zone of control and entry into another. Thus, sectarianism tangibly reconfigured
public space, creating a patchwork geography that reflected the various religious, ethnic,
and political identities of Lebanese citizens—a geography that was constantly re-asserted
through the policing of movement. Furthermore, street art played a crucial role in
demarcating the bounds of this new geography. According to Zeina Najjar, Lebanese
graffiti first appeared in the 1970s as a means of marking territory for warring militias.196
Throughout the civil war, militias intentionally weaponized visual materials such as
graffiti, posters, billboards, and banners to make visible their claim to power. As
boundaries shifted, the walls of the city quite literally illustrated the ebb and flow of
militia control. From this phenomenon, we can once again see how the struggle for
political power is also a struggle for spatial visibility and representation; and, as the
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nature of political and social relations change, so too does the nature of the space in
which these relations are enacted.
Fawwaz Traboulsi argues that, because space was inextricably linked to sectarian
identity, the consolidation of territory under various militias was the moment in which
“pressure on the individual to define himself/herself in terms of a unique social and
cultural sectarian identity reached its climax.”197 In fact, one of the primary reasons for
the immense bloodshed of the civil war was the various militias’ practices of ethnic,
sectarian, and political ‘cleansing’ to create religiously homogeneous regions within
Lebanon. In A History of Modern Lebanon, Traboulsi estimates that 71, 328 people were
killed, 97, 184 injured, and 894,717 displaced over the course of fifteen years. In addition
to ‘cleansing’ and ghettoizing populations based off perceived sectarian differences,
militias also perpetrated “memoricide”—“the eradication of all memories of coexistence
and common interests among the Lebanese.”198 The violent exclusion of groups of
different religious and ethnic associations, both from militias’ physical space and
collective psyche, served to further entrench the sectarian organization of Lebanese
society.
This physical and cultural violence, however, failed to assuage sectarian conflict
nor institute any semblance of national unity. Instead, the war became “the crucible in
which those sects were reproduced.”199 On October 22, 1989, Lebanon’s Parliament
signed the Ta‘if Agreements to end the Civil War and subsequently, in 1991, voted to
include the Agreements in a new constitution. While it dictated an equal ratio of
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Parliament seats between Christians and Muslims and abolished quotas for civil service
posts, “in practical terms, the Ta‘if regime reproduced the sectarian system.”200 The rule
requiring a Maronite President, a Sunni Prime Minister, and a Shi‘i Speaker of the
Parliament endured; however, the president’s executive powers were diminished, thus
creating “one of the most unstable power relations imaginable” and making “conflicts
among the holders of the three top posts…endemic.”201 Such precarious power dynamics
and deeply engrained sectarian divides have continued to shape Lebanon’s political
system long after the war’s end.
Public life, as well, continues to reflect the legacy of war and factional social and
political dynamics. With the city still split along largely sectarian lines and media outlets
dominated by sectarian leaders, “very few avenues for expression are left untouched by
sectarian rhetoric.”202 Street art, however, offers a counterpoint to the constant barrage of
divisive narratives. While political posters are still used, they now share space on the
walls of the city with anti-sectarian slogans, intricate murals celebrating cultural figures,
revolutionary stencils from Lebanon’s neighbors, and colorful expressions that beautify
the city. Through art—an accessible form of engagement for most residents—“Beirut’s
streets can come to serve as a public sphere of sorts.”203 The streets, by virtue of their
publicness, generate a new discourse among the people and serve as a method of
participatory politics. Furthermore, Lebanese street art is some of the most aesthetically
beautiful in the entire MENA region; it is intentionally and painstakingly designed and
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crafted. Rather than quickly spraying a space to mark territory, this new generation of
artists invests significant time and talent in the process of producing their art. By focusing
on beautifying the city, these artists attempt to move beyond warfare and violence
towards peace. Take, for example, the following piece by Hayat Chaaban:

https://www.behance.net/HayatChaaban/projects
Figure 20: “I Faced Death and Rose from the Ashes” by Hayat Chaaban
in Tripoli, Lebanon.
This piece is an artistic representation of the phrase “I Faced Death and Rose from the
Ashes.” Rather than simply scribbling the words on the wall, Chaaban communicates the
phrase in an entrancing visual manner. Chaaban’s choice to express the sentiment
aesthetically, through the use of elegant calligraffiti and bold color, reflects the artist’s
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desire to beautify the city.204 When we consider the physical location of the artwork, the
message of resilience becomes all the more salient. By painting the artwork upon a
visibly crumbling wall, Chaaban pairs the seemingly contradictory forces of destruction
and creation to show viewers how growth can emerge out of decay, the future can
supersede the past, and hope can spring forth from the remnants of suffering. Thus, the
physical elements of the street in which the art exists provide new meaning to the phrase.
The people of Lebanon quite literally faced death—whether that was threats to physical
safety, the destruction of homes, or the disintegration of communities—and rose from the
ashes by creating a future out of the ruins of war. In this singular piece, the artist offers a
symbolic rebirth of the city and shares a message of resiliency and hope for a new
generation of Lebanese youth. The message of Chaaban’s phrase is likewise echoed by
the following piece:
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https://www.alamy.com/stock-photo/beirut-street-art.html
Figure 21: A custodian sweeps up discarded bullets. Located in Beirut.
In this piece, a young male custodian sweeps up bullets which symbolize the remnants of
warfare. He is accompanied by two large birds, perhaps representing a return to the
natural state of the city. Again, the physical location of the artwork plays a role in
emphasizing the message. The artist strategically places the figure on a damaged wall to
further communicate his survival of past tragedy and his continued optimism. As the
custodian sweeps away the symbolic bullets, he reflects the people’s desire to reconcile
with the harsh realities of the past and make way for a new future.

Transgressing Spatial Boundaries
As Lebanon grapples with the legacy of civil war, its cities bear a consequential
geography. On one hand, sectarianism still structures much of political and social life;

121

cities are informally divided along sectarian lines, political posters claim space on the
walls, and the public domain remains limited to politically affiliated mainstream media.
On the other hand, urban revival projects initiated after the war created a sterilized,
impersonal, and contrived look and feel to areas of high market value. According to Saree
Makdisi, “there has been a concerted effort to wipe clean the surface of central Beirut,
purity it of all historical associations…to render it pure space, pure commodity, pure real
estate.”205 For example, the Company for the Development and Reconstruction of
Beirut’s Central District expropriated most of the land in the ancient city center to create
a shopping mall out of what once was a souk (a traditional marketplace or bazaar).
Meanwhile, areas of lower market value were not deemed worthy of rehabilitation and
were largely abandoned by the government. The result is an alienating effect akin to
gentrification.
In the midst of these complex urban dynamics, what is the role of street art? Street
art—an art form brought into existence precisely by the physical environment of the
city—is inextricably related to the structure and nature of public space. We see this
relationship at work in Lebanese street artists’ goals and finished products. For
neighborhoods sterilized by postwar revival projects, street art attempts to “reflect or
honor the Lebanese people’s struggles, local talents, or unique history” in order to bring
forth elements of humanity206 For neighborhoods abandoned by the government, street art
attempts “to protect public spaces and save them from disrepair” by beautifying the space
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and facilitating community207 Nevertheless, in every neighborhood, street art presents
counter narratives to mainstream media’s factionalism, builds consensus across sectarian
divides, and creates community identity centered around a future of peace. Whereas street
art was once used to ‘tag’ spaces for rival militias, it now primarily operates as a form of
communication that stands apart from, and often even transcends, sectarian divides. In
other words, street art—once a mechanism for enforcing and regulating borders—
becomes the very practice by which borders are reexamined, challenged, and
transcended. This practice is what Nadine Sinno calls “an aesthetic intervention.”208
Because borders govern individual and communal lives in such totalizing ways
(bullet holes and bombed-out buildings serve as a haunting reminder, after all), street
artists must confront their presence. Among Lebanese artists, we see that they work
within the realities of their situation by recognizing the existence of such borders,
offering a counter-oint, and providing an opportunity to transcend them. Take, for
example, the following image:
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https://wagingnonviolence.org/2015/10/tripoli-young-lebanese-defy-citys-violentreputation/
Figure 22: “Salam – Peace” by Hayat Chaaban in Tripoli.
In this piece by Hayat Chaaban, a single hand making the symbol of peace extends
upwards valiantly. As the hand breaks through an enclosure of sorts—represented by the
dark blue rectangular line—Chaaban shows that peace is a force that cannot be restrained
by borders or barriers. In particular, the barbed wire illustrates the capacity of peace to
free us from the ‘prison’ of violence, war, and sectarianism. Furthermore, there are many
ways to represent the concept of peace; Chaaban’s choice to use a human hand reflects
the capacity for peace that lies within humankind. Likewise, the solitary hand serves as a
reminder that peace is a unifying force; people of all identities and sects are united in
their desire for and struggle to create peace.
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The artistic duo known as ASHEKMAN, composed of twin brothers Omar and
Mohamed Kabbani, project the same message of peace on a larger scale:

https://www.middleeasteye.net/features/lebanese-street-artists-spread-message-peace
Figure 23: A collection of green-painted rooftops form the word “Salam,” meaning
“Peace.” Designed by ASHEKMAN (Omar and Mohammed Kabbani). Located in
Tripoli.
This innovative project comprised of eighty-five rooftops in Tripoli, Lebanon spells out
the Arabic word “Salam,” which means “Peace.” The vast expanse of the project
communicates the idea that peace spans geographic and urban divides, working as a
unifying force. More specifically, the artists intentionally put this piece on ‘Syria Street’
in the northern city of Tripoli which bisects the neighborhoods of Bab al-Tabbaneh and
Jabal Mohsen—two areas which have historically been at odds. Fighting between the
neighborhoods began in 1975 with the start of the civil war, as Bab al-Tabbaneh is a
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Sunni neighborhood and Jabal Mohsen is an Alawite neighborhood. Skirmishes between
the neighborhoods persisted on and off until 2015, as the former supported the Syrian
opposition and the later supported the Assad regime. The ASHEKMAN brothers cleverly
engineered the project to defy this sectarian border, thus physically illustrating how art
serves as a mechanism to transcend boundaries. Furthermore, the artists employed men
from each neighborhood—fifty-two in total—to help them paint the roofs. Because these
were the very same men who, just shortly before, had probably been fighting each other
on behalf of their respective militias, the project also served to unite the two groups in a
common goal. ASHEKMAN’s intentional design of both the piece of art and the process
of creation reminds us of Henri Lefebvre’s assertion that the process of production and
the product itself are two inseparable aspects of space. Thus, both the act of creating the
art and the art itself are dually significant.

Defining Transnationalism
In addition to transcending sectarian boundaries within Lebanese society,
Lebanon’s street art also transcends national and regional borders by exhibiting
transnationalism through the use of shared cultural symbols and the expression of
solidarity with popular movements. In order to see how transnationalism functions in the
Middle East and North Africa, we must first establish an appropriate definition of
transnationalism. In academic and scholarly contexts, transnationalism is generally
defined as economic and/or political integration. This definition leads scholars to focus
on the role of political leaders, regimes, and the state. Because the Middle East has not
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achieved significant political and economic integration, this definition leads us to
conclude that little or no transnationalism exists in the region.
This perspective, however, obscures meaningful forms of transnational exchange
that took place historically and still continue to exist today. The type of transnationalism
among Arab nations has been that of a cultural economy in which the people, not state
leaders or administrations, drive transnationalism through the exchange of shared cultural
elements. Two crucial facets emerge here: the role of culture and the role of the public.
First, cultural integration, rather than political or economic integration, form the basis of
this alternative definition of transnationalism. Mark LeVine argues that “culture is
inherently transnational,” and thus “has been the driving force behind contemporary
globalization far more so than in previous eras.”209 This phenomenon is reflected in the
ways in which citizens of the MENA exchange shared cultural elements, such as
language, phrases, images, popular figures, art, literature, music, etc. Secondly, this
definition of transnationalism is driven by the public; it is a ground-up, rather than a topdown approach to regionalization. This ground-up phenomenon—what Alain Tarrius
called “globalization from below”— “allows for a better understanding of the ways in
which the Middle East takes part in global transformations.”210 While political and
economic factors tend to dominate scholarly and popular understandings of transnational
integration, we should not let these factors “mask more informal forms of regionalization,
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which are initiated by non-state and local actors.”211 In other words, the transnational
exchanges taking place via ordinary people in popular social movements—albeit in noninstitutionalized ways—contribute to the “intensification of transnational relations.”212
Therefore, evaluating transnationalism in the MENA demands that we initiate a
conceptual shift in which we properly weigh the significance of the people as actors.
Street art serves as a visible way in which transnationalism takes place via the
exchange of cultural elements. Specifically, it allows communities to forge connections
“in a way that is not political or religious but cultural in a sense of…shared
symbolism.”213 We see this in the following mural, for example:

http://www.lebanontraveler.com/en/magazine/yazan_halwani_colors_beirut/
Figure 24: “1st Fairuz Mural” by Yazan Halwani in Beirut, Lebanon.
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This mural by Yazan Halwani depicts Fairuz, a renowned Lebanese singer whose music
is popular throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Her singing profile,
accompanied by calligraffiti, embellishes an otherwise ordinary alleyway. Halwani’s
mural is just one of many that celebrate beloved cultural figures. By covering the walls
with the faces of notable cultural icons, artists celebrate their “intellectual and artistic
contributions to society rather than their sectarian affiliation.”214 Fairuz is an especially
apt choice for this purpose because she often sings of a unified Lebanon. For example,
one of her most famous songs is “Behebak Ya Libnan” (“I Love You, Lebanon”). In fact,
during the Lebanese civil war of 1975 to 1990, Fairuz refused to side with any one group.
She did not perform in Lebanon during the war, only overseas. Furthermore, she sings in
Arabic—a language which transcends national and sectarian borders—and is regarded as
an icon in modern Arabic music. Due to the Maronite Christian affiliation with French
mandate policies, elite education is usually conducted in French. Thus, by singing in
Arabic, Fairuz’s music refuses the legacies of colonialism and transcends elitist barriers.
Arabic refuses the legacies of the French language as the language of the elite
Halwani’s choice to showcase a cultural figure, rather than a political one, offers an
alternative narrative to contentious politics and reflects an attempt to transcend sectarian
divides. By creating portraits of cultural icons, street artists disrupt the barrage of
political posters that dominate the walls and challenge expectations about which faces
adorn the city’s walls. Furthermore, Hawlani’s choice to showcase a figure recognizable
and meaningful to people all over the Arab region reflects an attempt to transcend
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Lebanon’s national borders. As Lebanese street artists look beyond the confines of
borders—both sectarian and national—and draw upon shared cultural symbols, they form
new collectivities, and with it, a new capacity for collective action.

Regional Solidarity
In 2011, when protests erupted in several Arab nations including Egypt and Syria,
street art in Lebanon reflected solidarity with the popular movements. The cultural
transnationalism already in existence throughout the Middle East and North Africa was
further accentuated by the introduction of these popular movements; in fact, Leila Vignal
argues that conflict can facilitate new transnational interactions, thus “leading to the
creation of a transnational space that did not exist previously.”215 We can see the
formation of these new transnational spaces reflected in Lebanese street art. Although
Lebanon did not experience a concurrent revolution during the Arab uprisings, much of
Lebanese public art expressed solidarity with the revolutions and captured the sentiments
and demands of the revolutionaries. Take, for example, the following stencil:
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https://suzeeinthecity.wordpress.com/2012/08/28/beirut-graffiti-quirkycolourful-street-art-in-lebanon/
Figure 25: A stencil in Beirut which reads “Be with the Revolution.”
This piece combines the street art techniques of stenciling and caligraffiti. In Beirut,
where the middle and upper classes increasingly use English and French, the use of
Arabic calligraphy is significant because it serves a symbolic function. According to
Basma Hamdy, the symbolic function of language “makes it a marker of group
boundary.”216 While the dialects of Arabic spoken across the MENA certainly vary, the
communicative aspect is less significant than the way in which the shared Arabic
language “contributes to the imagined bond between individuals, uniting them
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symbolically with a community across borders and nations.”217 Thus, the artist’s use of a
shared language to communicate solidarity with the revolutions compounds the sense of a
regional cultural identity that transcends national borders. Furthermore, this stencil was
originally made by Mohamed Gaber in Egypt. Because stencils are easily replicated, the
form of this piece was able to migrate across national borders to reach Beirut. The
structure of the phrase “Be with the Revolution” serves as a call to action for the
Lebanese public, yet, is broad enough to apply to any revolution. Rather than denouncing
a specific regime or dictator, the piece advocates for the support of the people in their
struggles against authoritarian systems. This broad phrasing creates a sense of ‘the
people’ as a transnational collective united in revolution.
This piece, like many of the others that appeared in 2011 and in following years,
draws attention to larger regional themes, rather than national specifics. Graffiti and
murals echoed the repudiation of established systems, the frustration with the constant
presence of violence in daily life, and the desire for abstract concepts such as freedom,
self-determination, and popular representation. In The Naked Blogger of Cairo: Creative
Insurgency in the Arab World, Marwan Kraidy notes how the popular slogans of the
revolutions reflect this regional solidarity. The slogan that dominated protests throughout
the Middle East and North Africa was “ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam,” or, “the people
want to topple the regime.” Kraidy, however, notes that “nizam” also translates to
“system.” This dual meaning reveals that “revolutionaries had in their crosshairs a bigger
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target than Ben Ali, Mubarak, and Assad, who, they realized, were but cruel faces of a
system experienced locally but sustained by global geopolitics and economics.”218

Global Solidarity
In addition to transcending national borders, Lebanese street art reflects an
engagement with global trends that reach beyond the confines of the MENA region and,
consequently, the forging of a cosmopolitan identity. This phenomenon is best
understood through an analysis of following piece of street art:

https://suzeeinthecity.wordpress.com/2012/08/28/beirut-graffiti-quirky-colourfulstreet-art-in-lebanon/
Figure 26: Graffiti in Beirut, Lebanon references the global Occupy Movement.
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While this stencil appears simple in design, it is a powerful reflection of transnationalism
in Lebanese street art. First, the stenciled phrase is in English. Because English is a
popular language worldwide and the language in which many global conversations take
place, artists often created stencils in English “in the hopes of appealing to the
international community.”219 The proliferation of English-language pieces helped
Lebanese artists gain traction among global media outlets. Global media, in turn, helped
to transmit the artists’ messages to larger audiences. Simon Hawkins argues that this
“recognition by the global audience helped confer legitimacy on the movement[s]”
reflected in the artwork—whether that be regional or global protests.220
Furthermore, the piece makes reference, both via words and images, to global
movements taking place far from Beirut. Specifically, the phrase “Occupy Beirut”
directly references the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States and shows
solidarity with the goals and strategies of that movement. In their workshop exploring the
transnational dimension of protest, Donatella della Porta and Alice Mattoni found that the
Arab uprisings were intimately linked to the European Indignados and the American
Occupy Wall Street protests; all three movements utilized similar practices and images of
democracy and similar communication and mediation processes. More specifically, each
movement “developed demands around the idea of democracy and, at the same time,
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engaged thousands of people in participatory democratic practices.”221 This piece of
street art in Lebanon, along with many others, demonstrates support for the Occupy
movement’s mobilization of the public and demands for democratic methods of
governance. Additionally, in cleverly appropriating the slogan for their own use, the artist
raises the question: how might the goals and strategies of global movements work to
improve the Lebanese political and economic systems?
By borrowing these ideas, images, and phrases from a global context and situating
them locally, the artist demonstrates what Pnina Werbner, Martin Webb, and Kathryn
Spellman-Poots call “citation.” Citation refers to the practice of using “aesthetic
allusions”—such as the Occupy movement’s green and red design—and “inter-textual
citations”—such as the call to occupy a city or location.222 Importantly, Werbner and
others note that citations can be “geographical,” meaning that they move across
borders.223 Artists in Beirut use geographical citation by referencing the Occupy
movement in New York City and, thus, defy national and regional constraints and forge
global connections. These global connections work to cultivate a sense of shared
experiences, collective history, and a global identity among distant communities.
The result of this use of citation is a burgeoning sense of cosmopolitanism,
reflected here in this stencil and among much of Lebanese street art (especially pieces
created by Lebanese youth). In considering the significance of their theory, Werbner and
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others argue that the global spread of citations have led “to a newly forged ‘vernacular
cosmopolitanism.’”224 Cosmopolitanism, as defined by Zeina Najjar, is comprised of four
main elements; first, it “goes beyond the nation-state model”; second, “it can negotiate
actions and ideals simultaneously oriented towards the global and the local”; third, it “is
opposed to forms of cultural essentialism”; and fourth, it “can represent a complex range
of identities and allegiances.”225 A significant portion of street art in Lebanon
demonstrates cosmopolitanism by exhibiting regional and global solidarity, using global
citations for local purposes, celebrating shared cultural figures and traditions among
many separate national groups, and representing the stories of community members with
widely divergent lived experiences. In illustrating a sense of cosmopolitanism, Lebanese
street artists forge ties among communities across sectarian, national, and regional
boundaries, thus alluding to the ideal of the ‘global citizen.’
Finally, we must recognize that demonstrating global solidarity through the
practice of citation (and thus, alluding to cosmopolitanism) is made possible through the
tools of technology. The exchange of images, slogans, and ideas among various
protesters, activists, and visual artists happens overwhelmingly through the internet and
social media. In her analysis of digital technologies in protest, Zeynep Tufekci presents
the idea of the “digitally networked public sphere,” arguing that the online spaces created
through the use of the internet and social media create a new public sphere where social
movements can flourish. Tufekci notes that, in the twenty-first century, the public
sphere—as a result of its digitally networked nature—is “also transnational and
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global.”226 By harnessing the power of new digital technologies, street artists can
incorporate global citations into their work, therefore expressing solidarity with
transnational popular movements and exploring a cosmopolitan collective identity.

Conclusion
When protests erupted in neighboring nations in 2011, Lebanon did not undergo a
revolution. It did not, however, remain insulated from regional and global events.
Lebanese street artists showed solidarity for revolutionaries and activists across the world
through the use of citation. This chapter demonstrates the value of studying history from
outside the dominant nation-state framework and the benefits of adopting a transnational
lens. Furthermore, the case of Lebanon reveals how art can function as a transformative
mechanism even in times of relative peace and stability. A new generation of Lebanese
street artists, many of whom did not personally experience the Civil War, retain the
collective memory of the war while desiring to use art to put forth narratives of
reconciliation, peace, and hope. Lebanese street art demonstrates the capacity for art to
communicate across borders and build consensus across sectarian, national, and regional
borders. In doing so, these efforts to use art as a narrative of reconciliation contributed, in
part, to laying the groundwork for the waves of protest in 2011—protests in which, for
the first time, old sectarian divides gave way to calls for new representative governmental
systems.
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The Image Endures

“Any form of art is a form of power.”
—Ossie Davis, American artist and civil rights activist

When protests broke out in the Middle East and North Africa in late 2010 and
early 2011, a flourish of creative activism irrevocably shaped the political, social, and
cultural histories of the region. Arab activists combined traditional tactics of protest—
such as legal recourse, legislative reform, and regime changes—with visual forms of
protest that encompassed a wide variety of artistic processes and products. From the
street to social media, artists harnessed the power of public space to inspire a collective
imagining of social change and assert a diverse range of communal identities. Through
art, the people demanded both immediate and long-term goals: the resignation of
dictators currently in power and the transformation of oppressive political and economic
systems.
In analyzing street art in Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, four main themes emerge:
first, street art co-opts public space, thus challenging the state’s authority over space and
subverting the state’s legitimacy; second, street art serves as an accessible and unifying
form of political engagement which facilitates the democratization of the protest process;
third, street art empowers communities caught in ceaseless violence through the use of
cynical humor and satire, which inverts the balance of power between the people and the
state; fourth, street art transcends both literal borders (urban, national, and regional) and
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metaphorical boundaries (spatial, political, cultural, and social), promoting reconciliation
and solidarity.
In this thesis, I attempted to balance the nuanced combination of street art’s
nationally-specific characteristics and transnational patterns. The three cases studies
presented illuminate how street art functions in divergent political contexts rooted in
distinctive histories: Egypt in revolution, Syria at war, and Lebanon amidst persistent
sectarianism. Common among each locale, however, were the central roles of the people
and of the image. The creation, alteration, and dissemination of visual materials gave
voice to the citizen collectivity in their struggle against the state—reinforcing the premise
that politics is art, as both enact the struggle for visibility and representation.
Much of the existing scholarship on the Arab Uprisings, and on revolutionary
movements in general, focuses exclusively on traditional forms of leadership in protest
and on the resulting political transformations of the state structure. An analysis of the
visual material produced through creative protest, however, serves as an alternative lens
through which to study the Arab Uprisings—a lens that reveals the complexity of power
relations in moments of crisis. This thesis assesses how art speaks during transitions of
power and social mobilizations and explores the intersection between the political, social,
and cultural forces at play in a given historical moment. Furthermore, this thesis
contributes to the existing body of scholarship on protest and revolution by considering
space and geography as critical elements of a society, a locus for the apportionment of
authority, and a battleground for the struggle over power.
The findings of this thesis are important because they demonstrate the value of
art as a form of political participation. Participatory politics take many forms, not all of
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which are sanctioned by the state. It is crucial that we conceptualize resistance as more
than just the actions of those with political and social power, and recognize the agency of
those who pursue resistance in less traditional forms. Examining political transitions
through the lens of art suggests an alternative way of understanding collective action.
These revolutions were as much social and cultural as they were political, so it is
also important to acknowledge the role of creativity as a force for change. We must
recognize art as a legitimate form of communication that generates discourse among the
people, between the citizenry and the state, within the larger MENA region, and even
towards an international audience. Furthermore, as protesters and revolutionaries echoed
each other across urban, national, and regional borders, the struggle against the state
became a collective enterprise of even larger proportions. The people saw, through art,
their own struggles reflected in global structures that sustained asymmetries of power—
politically, economically, and socially. History is made by the masses; studying public
artistic demonstrations is one way to capture this collective agency. Furthermore, art is a
form of participatory politics that does not require the prerequisite of citizenship, and
thus, operates outside the bounds of the nation-state framework. Artists used creative
methods to critique not only the regimes they lived under, but also the nature of the state
system itself and the larger societal patterns that serve to uphold both. By calling for
change that surpasses the replacement of one leader with the next and instead addresses
systemic, multifaceted issues, movements driven by creative protest were truly
revolutionary.
In a moment of historical irony, I completed this thesis in yet another period of
volatility, shaped by the flow of continuities and ruptures that historians analyze as a key
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component of their academic discipline. The novel coronavirus continues to engulf
communities worldwide, having spread to 212 countries and territories with 3.9 million
confirmed cases to date.227 Even as much of the medical, economic, and societal
ramifications of the virus remain unknown, it is clear that the pandemic will have
significant and long-term effects on our world. The crisis will have particularly
devastating repercussions in certain parts of the Middle East and North Africa. In Syria,
for example, the civil war has displaced more than 12 million people—half the nation’s
population—both internally and externally. Nearly 1.5 million of these people have
sought refuge in Lebanon, making it the country with the highest number of refugees per
capita. A large proportion of these displaced individuals, especially those in refugee
camps and temporary housing, lack access to basic needs such as sanitation and clean
drinking water. Healthcare services are lacking, as hospitals and medical facilities have
been direct targets of the Assad Regime and Russian forces. The effects of the pandemic
have been and will continue to be severely exacerbated by widespread poverty,
insufficient infrastructure, and a lack of clear leadership. In Syria alone, the United
Nations has allotted 3.3 billion dollars to aid 11 million Syrians in 2020.228 The
populations discussed in this thesis—the ordinary millions, the working class, the true
‘public’—are bearing the brunt of the COVID-19 crisis in a way that political and social
elites simply are not.
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Furthermore, the pandemic will likely prolong ongoing conflicts in the MENA
region. According to Ranj Alaaldin, the crisis will be “a conflict-multiplier as belligerents
move to intensify contestation over territories and resources, which will now include an
expanded focus on securing access to vital medical supplies.”229 In Libya, Yemen, and
Iraq, militias such as ISIS have exploited the needs of the population by controlling
medical aid and supplies in order to reinforce patronage networks. In Syria, existing
humanitarian issues are becoming increasingly problematic given the added factor of
COVID-19. While the World Health Organization offers support to Syrians from
Damascus, the Assad regime refuses to distribute this aid to any areas not under regime
control. In the northwest province of Idlib, one of the last areas still held by the
opposition, there are only 1.4 doctors for every 10,000 people and only 100 ventilators.230
In the northeast Kurdish-held region, Turkish forces have cut off water supplies. Political
and military factors are paralyzing the flow of medical aid to Syrians, further endangering
already vulnerable populations. The grim circumstances will likely spur another wave of
refugee migration which will, in turn, strain the resources of neighboring nations such as
Lebanon and Turkey.
In the midst of this disaster, how do we evaluate the role of art? Given this
upheaval, what is the value of the creative history presented in this thesis? How can we
understand the significance of the artistic element of the Arab Uprisings in light of our
present-day context? Art has long flourished in times of crisis. When words fail, the
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visual has a unique ability to capture the aesthetics of suffering. Street art is especially
equipped for such circumstances because it is an inherently public and communityoriented art form. Its very existence relies on public spaces and the community’s
engagement with those spaces. We must remember that it was the visual process that
empowered ordinary people to affect tangible change in their communities, their nations,
and the world—and, more specifically, it was street art that gave the people the tools to
do so. In times of upheaval, we turn to art for emotional expression, communication,
hope, community, and solidarity. The people of Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon did so in 2011
and many are doing so now. In fact, the art being created now bears many similarities to
the art created in the Middle East and North Africa nearly ten years ago.
Similar to the ways in which Syrians used satire as a weapon, artist Darion
Fleming is finding humor in the absurdity of the situation.
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https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/01/travel/coronavirus-street-art.html
Figure 27: “Pure’ll Gold” by Darion Fleming in Charlotte, North
Carolina, USA.
After he could not find hand sanitizer at his local grocery store, Fleming realized it would
soon be out of stock everywhere. In response, he spent eight days creating this mural
which depicts hand sanitizer as liquid gold. Fleming even titled the piece accordingly,
inserting an apostrophe into the brand name ‘Purell’ to create a play on words which
compares the product to ‘pure gold.’ Of the piece, Fleming said “I wanted to do
something for the community to enjoy in serious times.”231 In both this piece and the
Syrian artwork studied in this thesis, artists reflect on the absurd ways in which daily life
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has shifted profoundly. While in reference to different events, both contexts insert
pointed humor in dark and tragic times as a way to cope with suffering.
In both Syria and Egypt, artists used their craft as a form of critique: critique of
dictators, political systems, economic structures, and even the citizens’ own complicity in
perpetuating the crisis. Likewise, Berlin-based artist Eme Freethinker used street art to
comment on greed during the pandemic.

https://www.instagram.com/p/B97V9EmIL7a/
Figure 28: Gollum, from the “Lord of the Rings” films, holds a roll of toilet paper and
says “Mein Schatz” (“My Precious”). Created by Eme Freethinker in Berlin, Germany.
As the pandemic worsens, communities face shortages of essential items as individuals
buy more than they need in an effort to ‘stock up.’ This phenomenon happened most
famously with toilet paper. In response, Eme Freethinker created this mural in a public
park in Berlin to critique hoarders’ greed. The mural depicts Gollum, a character in the
“Lord of the Rings” films, who becomes corrupted by his all-consuming desire for a
magical ring, which he refers to as “my precious.” By equating ordinary citizens to this
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character, Freethinker hyperbolizes the negative effects of our desire for toilet paper. He
offers a cautionary tale: if we do not curb our self-centered greed, we will devolve into a
Gollum-like being. As Gollum cradles the toilet paper roll and calls it “my precious,”
Freethinker satirizes the way in which we inflate the value of the product, thinking of it
as a ‘precious’ object and losing sight of what it actually is. In poking fun at the toilet
paper shortage, Freethinker makes a valid critique of our complicity in perpetuating the
panic, chaos, and suffering of the pandemic.
In addition to using art to critique their circumstances and their own role, Arab
artists facilitated a sense of community identity and responsibility through their work. In
Santa Monica, California, Ruben Rojas is using his talents to send similar messages
during the pandemic.
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https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/01/arts/design/street-murals-artlos-angeles-virus.html
Figure 29: Two murals read “LOVE IS STANDING SIX-FEET
APART” and “TOGETHER WE CAN.” Created by Ruben Rojas in
Santa Monica, California, USA.
On the left side, Rojas has painted the words “Love is Standing Six-Feet Apart,”
referencing the guidelines set by health officials to prevent the spread of COVID-19. This
claim reminds viewers that following such guidelines protects not only ourselves, but
also our community members. On the right side, the phrase “Together We Can”
encourages residents to lean on the strength of the community during these challenging
times. The bright colors and cheerful design embellish the city, imbuing the space with
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beauty—a welcome counterpoint to the devastation of the disease. This piece is part of a
campaign called “Back to the Streets” created by the non-profit Beautify. The campaign
aims to produce one thousand murals by one thousand different artists in one hundred
cities across the United States. The project and Rojas’ mural are both attempts to
maintain the vibrancy of public spaces as community-centered spaces during this period
of social distancing.
Lastly, Arab artists across the region and especially those in Lebanon used art to
inspire hope for a better future. California artist Corie Mattie is doing the same.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/01/arts/design/street-murals-art-los-angeles-virus.html
Figure 30: A mural reads “AFTER THE PLAGUE CAME THE RENAISSANCE.”
Created by Corie Mattie in Santa Monica, California, USA.
This mural depicts a simplified version of the hands of Adam and God in “The Creation
of Adam,” a fresco painting by Michelangelo and a quintessential work of the

148

Renaissance. On the left side of the mural, it reads: “After the plague.” This eerily refers
to the COVID-19 pandemic, a new sort of plague. Yet on the other side, it reads: “Came
the Renaissance.” By invoking the current crisis, Mattie suggests that our own
Renaissance is coming. Mattie both acknowledges the severity of the present situation
and reassures viewers that a better future is sure to come.
As we can see from these images, artists today are using street art in many of the
same ways as Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese artists did in 2011: to claim power, to
reckon with our suffering, to create community solidarity, and to inspire hope in hopeless
times. This parallel reveals that creative acts can and will continue to flourish amidst
destruction. The image will endure. The global nature of the present crisis in particular
highlights the extent to which art can be a unifying force, linking communities worldwide
in this shared visual process. Especially in times of crisis, when words seem to fail us, it
is the visual form that gives voice to the people.
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